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ABSTRACT 
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME 
 
Bryan Weber 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor John S. Heywood and Professor Hamid Mohtadi 
 
Essay 1: “Can Safe Ride Program Reduce Urban Crime?” This paper evaluates 
the influence of a safe ride program at a public university on neighborhood crime in a 
major urban area. Using an hours of the week panel, the program's operation is associated 
with an approximate 14 percent reduction in crime. The program being open appears to 
have roughly similar influence in reducing violent and non-violent crime. Moreover, 
increases in rides (the intensity of the program) are also associated with reductions in 
crime. Such increases in program intensity are also associated with notably greater 
reductions in crime occurring on weekends. The cost of the safe ride program suggests it 
is a relatively efficient means of reducing crime.  
 
Essay 2: “University Provided Transit and Urban Crime.” This paper uniquely 
examines the influence of a new university bus service on urban crime. It concentrates on 
the interaction between the new bus service and a long-standing safe ride program. The 
new bus service reduces the number of students using the safe ride program and such 
substitution raises the well-known concern that a fixed transit route may concentrate 
victims and criminals increasing crime along the new bus routes. Despite this concern, a 
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series of difference-in-difference estimates demonstrate that the bus service reduces 
crime in the entire university neighborhood and that this reduction is actually largest 
along the new bus routes.  
 
Essay 3: “Modeling Adversary Decisions and Strategic Response.” This work 
uses a sequential game of conflict between a government and a terrorist organization to 
analyze the strategic choices between large extreme and large conventional threats. Some 
of these extreme options: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks (CBRN), 
are both terrifying and highly improbable. Conversely, conventional attacks using 
firearms or explosives, are comparatively more likely but less destructive. Rather than 
leaving the game as a theoretical exercise, we calibrate the model to real data from global 
terror attacks, and forecast anticipated casualties when an informed adversary prepares a 
large attack against an uninformed government. 
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Chapter 1: Can Safe Rides Reduce Urban Crime? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines a longitudinal case study designed to determine if safe ride 
programs, common at many universities, reduce urban crime. The study design matches 
local crime data to the area and service hours of the safe ride program. The estimates 
control for the hourly fixed effects and sensible covariates. They suggest the safe ride 
program reduces crime counts by 14%. This influence persists among different categories 
of crime. Moreover, increased program intensity, as measured by the number of rides 
delivered, also decreases crime counts. This influence is greater on weekends, as one 
might anticipate. The cost of the safe ride program suggests it is a relatively efficient way 
to reduce crime.  
This investigation is important as private expenditures on crime deterrence and 
prevention are enormous. As but one illustration, Americans spend more on private 
security forces ($41B) than on police ($13B) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Colleges and 
universities are particularly concerned about safety. Their expenditures on safety not only 
include safe ride programs, but also foot patrols , night-time escort services, emergency 
phone systems, increased lighting, and safety and crime prevention presentations. Indeed, 
14% of all US higher education institutions claim that the primary responsibility for their 
campus security lies with private security forces and initiatives (Lewis et al., 1997).  
As one such initiative, safe ride programs pick up and deliver students and staff 
for transportation near the university. The programs vary substantially, but most are 
designed to prevent victimization, or to reduce drunk driving by students (Lewis et al., 
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1997). Additionally, the programs are often touted for their convenience to students 
(Binghamton University, 2013). As of the latest examination by the National Center for 
Education Statistics, 34% of public four-year universities, and 24% of their private four-
year counterparts had safe ride programs set up for students and staff (Lewis et al., 1997). 
Since the Jeanne Clery Act of 1991, universities must make crime data public for their 
campus area. These data are often pivotal in the enrollment decisions of potential students 
and their families. This creates an additional private incentive for safe ride programs.1  
The research on safe rides remains largely anecdotal, and to the best of my 
knowledge there has been no prior economic evaluation of their efficiency in reducing 
crime.2 This reflects, in part, the remarkable diversity in these programs as there is no 
federal or state design or regulation of the many individual safe ride programs 
implemented by US universities. Survey data suggest that the majority of students (60%) 
believe that safe ride programs are effective, while an equal percentage claim safe ride 
programs also promote drinking (Elam et al., 2006). Moving beyond such surveys is 
warranted, as safe ride programs represent a substantial and commonplace investment, 
and there exists a growing academic interest in the broad relationship between 
transportation and crime.  
Jackson and Owens (2011) study the relationship between the operating hours of 
the Washington DC subway, DUI's and drinking-related crimes. They create an hour of 
the week panel to show that a 1999 expansion of the subway service by 3 hours per week 
reduced DUI arrests by 14%. At the same time, the expansion increased other alcohol 
related crimes by 5.4%. They suggest that the subway simultaneously provides an 
alternative to drunk driving, while increasing access to alcohol. Other research explores 
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whether or not transit station s are associated with greater crime in surrounding 
neighborhoods (Poister, 1996; Liggett et al., 2003). The existing economic theory 
suggests that safe ride programs influence crime by changing the profits of illegal activity 
(Becker, 1968). Safe ride program s lower the number of potential victims around the 
university, creating a less target rich environment for criminals. Moreover, universities 
may use the transit vehicles as additional eyes on the street, so pedestrians and frequently 
passed households will be safer. As a consequence, the ride program increases the costs 
of committing crime near the university, lowering the profit of crime, and motivating 
potential criminals to instead pursue legal activities, or choose another time or place for 
their criminal activities. Finally, and with some irony, safe ride programs may transport, 
and thereby contain, students who otherwise might choose criminal behavior while 
walking on the streets.  
The possibility remains that the program need not decrease crime. The safe ride 
program examined here makes trips to and from entertainment districts with bars, which 
increase student access to alcohol. Alcohol causes impaired judgment, resulting in 
victimization, or leading to students committing crime (Liggett et al., 2003). Since the net 
effect and the magnitude of the impact is not inherently clear, empirical analysis is 
needed.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
safe ride program in detail, and examines the source of identifying variation in its 
provision. The matching of crime data and controls are then described. The third section 
describes the methodology, which addresses the possibility for reverse causality. It also 
presents basic results, and alternative specifications. The fourth section checks for 
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heterogeneity in the impact of the program. The fifth section makes a comparison of the 
cost-effectiveness of this program versus that of the police. The sixth and final section 
concludes and suggests further research.  
 
2. Safe Rides and Crime: The Case Study  
 
 
2.1 Description of the Safe Ride Program 
 
 
The data follows Be On the Safe Side (BOSS), a safe ride program operate d by 
the Student Services Department of University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM). UWM 
has about 30,000 students, and is located on the upper east side of Milwaukee. About 1/3 
of all students are residential and live on campus or in the immediate area. A new 
initiative beginning fall of 2013 requires first-year students to live in student housing for 
one year, suggesting that this proportion will increase (University Housing Department, 
2012).  
At UWM, all students and staff have access to BOSS, which provides taxi-like 
services in a region surrounding UW-Milwaukee (See Figure 1). These services are free 
at the point of service, but each student pays a segregated fee, which includes $10.30 a 
semester to support BOSS (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012). Students call for 
a ride, wait indoors until a van arrives, and then the van takes them to their destination, 
which must be an address rather than a street corner. Vans are marked by combinations of 
unique lights and paint, and are connected by radio with a central station in the student 
union.  
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Typically, the program operates at night, being open about 25% of all hours. The 
safe ride program takes students to any destination within an operating radius of 
approximately 1.5 miles around campus, including bars, supermarkets, and residence 
halls. The program operates in all seasons, including summer, permitting students to 
anticipate it being available for reasons varying from grocery runs to replacing designated 
drivers. Over the study period from 2005 to 2008, BOSS provided an average of 133,733 
rides a year at an average cost of $3.18 each.3 Such trips add up to a great distance, with 
BOSS vans traveling 255,000 miles per year (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 
2012). The program began operating on September 5th, 2001, and school officials 
anticipate it continuing well into the future.  
 
2.2. Data on the Safe Ride Program  
 
 
Data on operating hours and the number of rides has been collected hourly from 
January 1st, 2005 to June 30th, 2008. This data window reflects the employment of a data 
entry worker, and as such there are no comparable records outside this period. Our initial 
independent variable is whether or not the safe ride program is open during any particular 
hour of the week. The program is typically open during the evening and early morning 
hours, both when school is in session and otherwise, but does close for inclement weather 
and holidays. In addition, policy changes have occasionally altered the operating hours of 
the service. The result is a large amount of variation, as shown in Table 1. The hours of 
2am through 4pm show no variation, because the program was always closed. The 
remaining hours of the week, the early morning and late evening hours, average 24 
separate instances of transitioning between open and closed each, out of the potential 
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181. This variation allows for testing the impact of the changing hours of the program, 
and suggests that the provision, or absence, of the safe ride program is not clearly 
associated with any singular event. Ultimately, the data is arranged into an hour of the 
week panel. This arrangement follows Jackson and Owens (2011), and yields 168 (7x24) 
hourly observations for each of 182 weeks. Thus, a unit of observation would be the first 
hour of Monday, observed for 182 weeks. In the fixed effect model, I examine the 
variation generated by changes within each hour of the week. Thus, for the 182 weeks, 
there are a maximum of 181 changes that could occur within the first hour of Monday.4  
 
2.3. Matching Crime Data to the Safe Ride Program  
 
 
Crime data is gathered from the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD), and is 
available through the online system Community Mapping and Analysis for Safety 
Strategies (COMPASS) (City of Milwaukee, 2014). This system identifies the hour and 
date of each separate crime, the exact address where the crime occurred, and the type of 
crime.5 The system tracks 35 different crime types, tabulated in Table 23, placed in 
Appendix A. COMPASS has an entry for every report issued within city boundaries, but 
only after January 1st, 2005. Using geographic information systems (GIS) software, only 
those crimes with addresses inside the strict boundaries of the safe ride program service 
region are selected. The crime types are aggregated into a single total crime count 
variable. Within that region, there is an average of one crime an hour.6 After the crime 
data were limited to the geographic area of the program and aggregated into hourly totals, 
the data is then restricted to the 2005-2008 window where both crime and safe ride data 
are available. The crime data were matched to the safe ride data in hour of the week 
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panels for all 182 weeks. Thus, for every hour, I know the number of crimes in the 
service region, and whether or not the program was in service. The data in Figure 2 
indicate that crime is trending up over the data window, while the program hours show no 
trend.7 Empirical estimates will disaggregate the crime count data into more narrow types 
of crime to check for variation in the impact of the safe ride program and will account for 
the apparent trend.  
 
2.4. Matching Data on Controls  
 
While the ultimate objective is to obtain an estimate of the impact of the safe ride 
program on crime counts, there is a recognized need to control for other short-term 
determinants of crime. Obvious controls, such as the month of the year, day, and hour, 
are extracted from the time on the crime report. Beyond that, UWM's official records 
provide full information on the dates class was in session. This includes finals week, and 
keeps track of various mid-semester breaks and vacations. Any calendar day with school 
in session is marked as a school day. Both school days and month of the year are strong 
determinants of the number of students around campus.  
A complementary selection of weather controls from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (NOAA, 2012) was obtained. These controls are 
daily measures of precipitation, snowfall, snow on the ground, and minimum 
temperature.8 Such controls have been shown to be deterrents of crime (Falk, 1952; 
Anderson, 1989; Cohn, 1990; Jacob et al., 2004), and are also strong determinants of the 
number of rides provided by the safe ride program. The daily weather is matched to each 
hour of that calendar day.  
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While a number of other demographic controls could be added, such as income, 
age, or racial demographics, they would not vary substantially over the data window. The 
final data set then consists of 30,648 consecutive hourly observations. For each hour, the 
data set provides the day of week and the month, the number of crimes in the service 
region, an indicator if the safe ride program operated or not, the number of rides provide 
if operating, an indicator that school was in session or not, and indicators of weather. The 
summary statistics for all data are shown in Table 2.  
 
3. Estimation Strategy and Initial Results  
 
 
In thinking about the influence of safe ride programs on crime, there is concern 
with reverse causality. One might anticipate that university policy makers would target a 
safe ride program to be open during high crime hours and leave it closed in low crime 
hours. If this influence dominates, one could find a positive correlation between the hours 
the program is open and the count of crime. Indeed, data gathered across US cities 
confirms that more crimes occur during the hours the safe ride program is in operation, 
5pm to 2am (Falk, 1952). Generally, national data confirm that relatively little crime 
occurs between 2am and noon, and the night hours before 2am have more crime than 
daylight hours (Dudzinski, 2011). Again, a rational policy maker would target high crime 
night hours, potentially generating a misleading correlation with crime counts.  
The above concern emphasizes the importance of selecting an estimation strategy 
that controls for this reverse causality. In order to measure the impact of the safe ride 
program, a variety of specifications were explored, but ultimately I select a specification 
that controls for fixed effects in an hour of the week panel. Each hour of the week is 
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presumed to have a unique propensity for crime over the data window. This propensity 
can be controlled for because of the frequent openings and closings of the safe ride 
program within any hour over the time series. The estimates show that failure to control 
for these fixed effects generates an estimate for the safe ride program that conflates the 
program's crime reducing influence with the tendency of the program to operate during 
high-crime hours. By comparing pooled and fixed effect estimates, the size of this 
confounding effect is isolated.  
 
3.1. Primary Specification and Results  
 
 
As suggested, the variation in the provision of the safe ride program permits 
identification of the programs’ impact on crime. The following regression is estimated, 
adding controls to build a more complete specification:  
 = 	
 ∗  +  ∗  +  
The unit of observation is the hour of week, i, from week t in the 182 weeks of the 
time frame. The variable of interest is openit, where openit is 1 if the safe ride service is 
available that particular hour, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient  indicates the 
relationship between the safe ride program being open and crime. The contents of the 
control vector, , vary with the specific estimate. Noting that the crime data is count 
data, Poisson estimates are typically presented, but I will show that OLS produces very 
similar estimates. 
 
3.2. Primary Results  
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In Table 3, the basic Poisson estimates are shown with four different specification 
s of the control vector, . Conveniently, the coefficients can be interpreted as the 
approximate response in the percentage of hourly crimes from a unit increase in the 
independent variable.9  
Poisson data may suffer from overdispersion, which occurs when the standard 
errors are greater than the mean (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Atkins and Gallop, 2007). 
This can create incorrectly small estimates of the standard errors. In order to prevent 
overdispersion from creating false positives, the coefficients are bootstrapped 200 times 
following the recommendation from Efron and Tibshirani (1993).10  
Concern about correlation within the hours of the week leads to clustering 
standard errors by each hour of the week. After bootstrapping and clustering, the 
estimated standard errors are about twice as large as the unadjusted errors. As a 
consequence, false positives are less likely.  
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the initial simple regression when pooling the data 
(not controlling for fixed effects), and indicates that the safe ride program is correlated 
with a weakly significant 9% decline in crime. In Column 2, I include dummies for 
whether school is in session, and to compensate for the cyclical components of yearly 
crime, dummies were added for the month of the year. When school is in session, crime 
is 15% greater than when school is closed. I found that the months of August through 
November emerge as higher crime months, perhaps because of the large number of new 
first year students arriving in those months. The pooled estimate of the effect of the safe 
ride program remains about the same at 8%, suggesting that these variables are not 
correcting for a large omitted variable bias. Column 3 adds weather to the controls, since 
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weather clearly impacts both demand for transportation as well as crime. These weather 
controls are precipitation, snowfall, snow on the ground, and minimum temperature. The 
weather effects suggest a general theme: crimes are more likely in hospitable weather and 
less likely in inclement weather, such as snow, rain, or cold. The impact of weather on 
crime is attributed to criminals facing limited access and availability of victims on the 
street. Such a result also fits with the suggestion that hot weather itself may induce 
criminal behavior (Falk, 1952; Anderson, 1989; Cohn, 1990; Jacob et al., 2004). In any 
event, the estimated impact of the safe ride program remains at roughly 8%, again 
suggesting that weather, while clearly an important determinate of crime counts, appears 
to be uncorrelated with the impact of the safe ride program being open. While the signs 
on the controls seem reasonable, the regressions have not yet accounted for the fixed hour 
of the week effect.  
The next regression accounts for the fact that each hour of the week tends to have 
different amounts of total crime. Thus, the estimate is generated by variation over time 
within the hour of week. The fixed effect Poisson estimation (Wooldridge, 2001) is one 
of the few nonlinear fixed effect estimates which avoids the incidental parameter 
problems (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). The estimated effect of the safe ride program, 
shown in Column 4, jumps dramatically to 14%, suggesting that almost half the true 
impact (6%) was hidden by the placement of the program in high crime hours. Thus, 
while adding the other controls had no noticeable impact on the program's coefficient, the 
fixed effects appear to be critical omitted variables.  
For comparison, the regressions in Table 3 have been repeated using naive OLS 
estimates in Table 4. In the estimates, the coefficient on the program represents the 
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reduction in crime counts associated with the program being open. The influence of the 
program is a reduction of 0.07 crimes an hour in early estimates, but grows to 0.12 when 
using fixed effects. The OLS estimates, therefore, also exemplify the strong impact of the 
fixed effects. Again suggesting much of the impact is hidden behind the tendency for the 
program to be placed in high crime hours. Overall, the similarity of the OLS estimates 
suggests that the results do not appear to be dependent on the functional form.11 
  It is emphasized that there are two reasons why the hour of the week fixed 
effects could be critical. First, as has been suggested, it may be that the hours in which 
the safe ride program is typically open are those with high crime. Second, it could simply 
be that within the hours the program is typically open, but may be closed, there are 
important hour of the week fixed effects.  In this second possibility, there could be 
peripheral hours (very late at night or early in the morning) that tend to have lower crime 
and these are the hours that the safe ride program is less likely to be open. To distinguish 
between these two cases, the sample of hours is limited to the hours of the week in which 
the safe ride program has been open at least once, a restricted sample of \typically open 
hours". Table 5 reproduces the four Poisson estimates from Table 3 on this restricted 
sample of typically open hours.   
The estimated coefficients on the open dummy, indicating the program is open, 
are essentially the same across all specifications. Moreover, the coefficient on the open 
dummy is virtually identical (14%) to the fixed effects Poisson estimates in Table 3. For 
example, a simple comparison between open and closed hours in the smaller sample 
shows the safe ride program is associated with a 14% reduction in crime, and the further 
addition of fixed effects only changes the estimate by 1%. Therefore, it is concluded that 
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within the typically open hours, the fixed effect component in the variation of crime is 
not critical. The important distinction for estimation is, in fact, that the program is 
typically provided in high crime hours.   
 
3.3 Challenges to Identification 
 
 
There exist several potential reasons why one might question the results presented 
so far. First, the estimates have not tested for a time trend in crime. The results could 
reflect the program growing or contracting while crime simply has a trend in the opposite 
direction. To test for this possibility, I include a weekly linear time trend for the entire 
data window for Tables 3, 4, and 5, and find no meaningful change. For example, in 
Table 3, column 4, when including the time trend, the coefficient on the trend, while 
significant, is estimated as a very small 0.00198, suggesting a very small an increase in 
crime rates. The coefficient of interest measuring the association of rides with crime 
counts remains in the same neighborhood at a negative and significant -13.3%. As an 
alternative, I added dummies for each calendar year. While several were significant, the 
coefficient on the program remained 13% and highly significant.   
Second, it remains possible that general patterns in the city's crime count are 
somehow driving the results. We provide a falsification test to emphasize that the results 
are, indeed, unique to the treatment area. The model was re-estimated using the crime 
counts for a city neighborhood that was eight miles away from the program boundary, 
Bay View. This neighborhood has the most similar demographics of the remaining city 
areas, which leads to its informal nickname as “The Other East Side". The hope is that 
such a neighborhood will have similar crime dynamics as the treatment area. Re-
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estimating the hour fixed effects model, the influence of the program being open on 
crime in Bay View returns an insignificant coefficient of -0.028 with a standard error of 
0.059. Had this falsification test generated a significant coefficient, the estimated 
influence of the program on the university neighborhood might be doubted. The 
coefficient in the treated region was estimated at -0.152, more than two of these standard 
errors smaller than the value of the Bay View coefficient. 
A third concern is that the estimates can only control for time-invariant fixed 
effects. Thus, if policy makers have placed the program in consistently high-crime hours, 
we can hold that constant. What is not accounted for is the potential for a stochastic 
change in crime influencing policy.  A classic example would be if crime is unusually 
high and policy makers expand the program. This is then followed by a natural mean 
reversion generating a misleading picture of the program's influence. While we cannot 
completely rule this out, we follow Priks (2009), by arguing that our falsification test 
provides some reassurance. If the spike in crime that generated the policy change was 
evident around the city, our Bay View results should have also returned negative and 
significant results. These results suggest that the pattern is not driven by sudden and 
temporary spikes in crime, at least, at the city wide level.12  
 
3.4 The Role of Zero Inflation 
 
 
The earlier results in Table 5 show that the fixed effects estimates from the all 
hours sample are broadly similar to any estimate from the smaller sample of typically 
open hours. Yet, even within the typically open sample used for Table 5, 53% of the 
hourly observations have a crime count of zero, suggesting zero-inflation.13   
15 
 
Despite the indication that ZIP may be a better fit for the data, the computational 
advantages of using the simple Poisson approach in this context are enormous. Several 
efforts are made to estimate the ZIP. In this case, the computing time of the ZIP model in 
the full sample proved infeasible. Even when restricting attention to the typically open 
hours, the estimate needed to be moved onto a 96 core processor as parallel tasks 
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013) in order to resample and estimate 
coefficients. The output of these re-estimations were then aggregated and used to 
calculate the standard errors of the ZIP model.14   
To obtain an estimate of the impact of the safe ride program, the average marginal 
effects (AME) must be calculated (Bartus, 2005). The standard errors of the AME were 
bootstrapped 200 times and accounted for clustering among hours of the week.   
Two separate estimates were undertaken. In the first estimate, the outcome relies 
upon the broad similarity found in the earlier estimates between the sample of typically 
open hours and the fixed effect estimates in the all hours sample. Thus, the estimates use 
the typically open hours sample, without hour fixed effects. The results are presented in 
Column 1 of Table 6, and the controls play a broadly similar role to that isolated earlier. 
The results also suggest a significant 14% decrease in crime when accounting for zero 
inflation in the model. The estimate is virtually identical to those without the ZIP.  In the 
second estimate, the typically open sample is again used, but includes dummies for each 
hour of the week, recognizing the possible bias associated with doing so (Greene, 2001, 
2004).15 The large number of dummies makes both bootstrapping and clustering more 
difficult, but the point estimate remains nearly identical and significant, as shown in 
Column 2.   
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While not the same functional form as estimated in the previous tables, the critical 
point estimates remain quite firmly around 14%. Thus, there is no indication that failure 
to account for zero-inflation results in misleading estimates in the earlier tables. As a 
consequence, in order to save substantial time and present a full range of estimates, focus 
remains on Poisson estimates when examining treatment heterogeneity and robustness.  
 
4. Extensions  
 
 
In this section, the simple Poisson estimates are re-examined, with the intention to 
examine heterogeneity in the measured treatment effect. First, the influence of the 
program is examined for variation across types of crime. Second, differences in the 
impact of the program during the weekend as compared to during the weekdays are 
examined. In the second subsection, an investigation is conducted of a measure of 
program intensity, the number of rides delivered in an hour. At issue is whether this 
measure is associated with reduced crime, and whether the heterogeneity identified with 
the dichotomous measure remains important.  
 
4.1 Heterogeneity in Treatment 
 
 
One might expect differentiation in impacts across types of crime, as have been 
found in other papers (Levitt, 2002; Jackson and Owens, 2011). Typically, violent crimes 
are thought of as crimes of impulse, and therefore less responsive to economic incentives, 
as compared to nonviolent crimes. We use the Uniform Crime Report's (UCR) definition 
of crime against persons as a measure of violent crimes, and compare it with the 
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remaining categories, crimes against property and against society (US Department of 
Justice, 2000).16 Thus, each hour includes a number of violent and a number of 
nonviolent crimes. This allows two separate estimates of the influence of the program. 
The sample is that of all hours, and the controls remain the same. The estimates continue 
to be bootstrapped and account for clustering.   
Table 7 shows that the estimated impact of the program is roughly similar in 
preventing each type of crime. The magnitudes of the impact (17% for crimes against 
property and against society, and 13% for personal crimes) are both significant, and 
roughly comparable to the overall estimate of 14%. Both estimate s are within a standard 
deviation of the other, also suggesting a relatively homogeneous impact. If anything, 
there is a slightly greater impact on violent crimes than nonviolent ones. Again, the 
pattern of coefficients on the controls remain broadly similar to all previous regressions.  
Weekends on and around campus involve frequent trips associated with social events, 
parties, and entertainment districts. These trips appear different in kind from the typical 
weekday trips between home and campus. Criminals may target those traveling to and 
from these locations differently. Those traveling for entertainment purposes likely carry 
more cash, increasing the potential revenues earned by criminals. Moreover, providing 
rides to events with alcohol may actually increase student victimization, since they are 
generally less aware of their surroundings. Alcohol may even encourage criminal 
behavior by students themselves, such as disorderly conduct or destruction of property as 
they walk between locations. This suggests there could be a different impact from 
program operation in the weekends than on the weekdays.   
18 
 
To test for heterogeneous impacts, the aggregate total crime counts are once again 
examined. An interaction term between open and the weekend is added, taking the value 
1 when the program is open on Friday and Saturday, and 0 otherwise, to the all hours 
specifications from Table 3.17 The new set of estimates are shown in Table 8. The results 
show no significant impact of either open or its interaction with weekends until fixed 
effects are added in Column 4. Again, this demonstrates the importance of controlling for 
the policy makers tendency to offer the program in high crime hours. After adding fixed 
effects, the coefficient on open again doubles from a negative but insignificant 7% to a 
negative and significant 16%. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, but 
remains far from significant. Nonetheless, the positive coefficient on the interaction 
between open and weekend hints the program may be less effective when open on the 
weekends. Again, the controls behave similarly to previous results. The next section 
compares these estimates with those obtained from examining the program intensity, 
where a far stronger difference is discovered.    
 
4.2. Program Intensity  
 
Beyond simply being open and closed, the number of hourly rides given while the 
program is open dramatically varies between zero to one hundred seventy-five. This 
variation largely reflects not the policy-makers supply, but rather the potential victims’ 
demand for rides.18 It seems reasonable that demand is highest at times or during 
circumstances of the greatest anticipated crime. This might imply a positive association 
between the number of rides and crime. Yet, the provision of additional rides indicates 
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the extent to which potential victims are moved off the street and so may be associated 
with a genuine reduction in crime, a reduction that could hopefully be isolated.   
To isolate this influence, the sample is limited to include only the hours in which 
the program is open. Within that sample, the total number of rides given in the hour is the 
measure of treatment intensity. The estimates, shown in Table 9, use the same 
bootstrapping and clustering as previously discussed. The first column uses the intensity 
measure in a simple Poisson regression. It indicates a statistically significant decline in 
crime of about a fourth of a percent per ride. The second two columns display the 
additional influence of school in session, weather, and month controls. These controls 
appear associated with both crime and the demand for rides, as shown by the now small 
and insignificant coefficient on the number of rides delivered. While weather was not an 
important omitted variable when examining the coefficient indicating when the program 
is open, it does emerge as influential on the rides coefficient. This seems reasonable as 
weather likely influences the number of rides during hours the safe ride program is open, 
but does not affect whether or not the safe ride program is open.   
The final estimate in Table 9 adds hour of the week fixed effects, and more than 
doubles the magnitude of the coefficient on rides. It is now highly significant, and the 
magnitude implies that an increase in the number of rides by one standard deviation (17 
rides in an hour) is associated with a crime count that is 8.4% lower in that hour. Once 
again, controlling for hour of the week fixed effects is critical in estimating the influence 
of the program on crime. Failure to do so results in estimates that suggest the program is 
ineffective. Yet, this suggestion largely reflects the tendency of the program to give more 
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rides in hours of high crime. The pattern of controls remain roughly unchanged as a result 
of the fixed effects.19  
Next, the rides measure is examined for heterogeneity in treatment. Crimes are 
again divided into two types, crimes against persons, which represents violent crimes, 
and the remaining categories, crimes against property and crimes against society. The 
sample continues to include only those hours in which the program is open. The results, 
shown in Table 10, indicate that more rides are correlated with a lower crime count for 
both types of crime. It is noted that the weather controls are weaker in this regression, 
likely due to a strong correlation with requests for rides. This does not detract, however 
from the main point of this table. An increase in the number of rides by one standard 
deviation (17 rides in an hour) is associated with a decline in nonviolent crime of 7%, and 
a decline in violent crimes of 11%. Both estimates are significant. This suggests the 
delivering of rides may be more effective at preventing violent crimes in the targeted 
neighborhood. While a formal test of differences is unavailable, it should be noted that 
each estimate is more than 2.5 standard deviations from the other.   
The next investigation aims to isolate the variation in the influence of program 
intensity between weekends and weekdays. Continuing to use the sample of only open 
hours, I use the weekend dummy and interact it with the number of rides given by the 
program in each hour, and repeat the estimations from Table 9. The same clustering and 
bootstrapping techniques continue to be used. Column 1 of Table 11 shows that the 
estimate without other controls indicates that rides given on weekends are associated with 
a significantly larger decrease in crime than rides given on weekdays. Columns 2 and 3 
introduce controls and this results in the coefficients on rides becoming statistically 
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insignificant. Yet, column 4 adds the fixed effects, and again causes the coefficient on 
rides to become large and highly significant, a pattern seen earlier. The result of the fixed 
effect estimate is a doubling of the coefficient on hourly rides back to a similar value as 
seen in Column 1. The point estimate suggests that an additional ride lowers the number 
of crimes by 0.3 percent. At the same time, the addition of fixed effects has an even 
larger impact on the interaction term, quadrupling the point estimate to a negative 0.5 
percent. Thus, each ride on the weekend is associated with a total reduction of crime of 
0.8 percent. Again, this suggests the fixed effects account for a large conflating effect, 
namely the higher demand for rides in hours of the week prone to high crime. It is noted 
that the coefficients for the controls are otherwise similar to previous estimates.  
The relative magnitudes suggest that an increase in rides by one standard 
deviation lowers the crime in that weekday hour by 5%, but if the same number of rides 
are delivered on a weekend, the crime during that hour declines by 13%. This suggests 
that the rides the program delivers on the weekend are noticeably and significantly more 
effective. On the weekend, a marked increase in students who are relatively easy and 
lucrative targets for criminals is anticipated. On the weekend, students may be carrying 
cash for entertainment costs, and alcohol may impair their judgment. The rides program 
removes high probability targets from the streets and so appears to have a larger influence 
on the weekend than on weekdays. This suggests a particularly strong effect of increasing 
program intensity on the weekends.   
When comparing the two measures of the program's impact, there was no 
significant difference between weekends and weekdays when looking at the open status 
of the program, but now, a significant difference when examining rides delivered. The 
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simple indication of whether or not the program is open pools high ride hours with low 
ride hours together into simply open hours. It emerges that this variation within the open 
hours masked a critical difference how the program influences crime on weekends and 
weekdays.   
 
5. Cost-effectiveness Comparison  
 
A rough comparison shows that the safe ride program may be at least as cost-
effective as police. Calculations support that this program was associated with an 
estimated reduction of 220 crimes a year.20 This is about 0.6% of the city's total yearly 
crime reported to the UCR (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). Comparing this to the 
effectiveness of officers as measured by (Levitt, 2002), it is found that to eliminate the 
same number of crimes, an increase of 1.2% in the police force would be needed.21 This 
would cost over $1,300,000.22 The safe ride program itself costs about $425,000, 
suggesting that the program may be very cost-effective.   
It is recognized that this estimate is only a very rough approximation of the 
relative cost-effectiveness. It is possible that the safe ride program does not eliminate 
crime, but simply displaces it. See Bowers and Johnson (2003) on the general issue of 
measuring crime displacement. If displacement occurs, criminals respond by relocating 
crime to another time or place where net returns are higher. As a consequence, the actual 
reduction of crime from the program will be lower than estimated here. Thus, the 
program may cause crime to move out of the university area and into the surrounding 
neighborhoods not serviced by the program. This may not influence the efficiency of the 
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program from the universities’ perspective, but is relevant from a social welfare 
perspective.   
I have undertaken two separate regressions to test for the presence of the 
displacement. Checking for spatial displacement, I examine the relationship between the 
hours the program is open and the crime rate in a postal code adjacent to the safe ride 
program's operating boundaries. Estimating the hours fixed effect model, I now use crime 
counts from the outside postal code, but all else remains the same. I find that the open 
hours of the program are correlated with an insignificant reduction in crime of -1.8% in 
the adjacent postal code.23 This does not support the idea that the program is causing 
substantial displacement in the neighboring postal code. I next return to crime counts in 
the program service region but add two indicator dummies, one for the hour before the 
program opens, and one for the hour after the program closes. These coefficients are 
insignificant with t-stats less than one, and are both negative. Overall, none of these 
estimates find evidence to support the claim that displacement is occurring, but it is 
possible that the displacement is more complex than these tests could uncover.    
Another concern is that the safe ride program operates in a middle class college 
neighborhood, while police operate across the entire city. It seems intuitive that other 
neighborhoods, such as very low income or industrial areas, will vary in responsiveness 
to measures to reduce crime. Consequently, placing a safe ride program in a dramatically 
different area is unlikely to have an equivalent effect. Therefore, one should be cautious 
in generalizing the effectiveness of the program to areas that lacks similar demographic 
characteristics.   
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In addition, there is likely complementarity between police and the safe ride 
program. Police are present at all times in the analysis. As a result, no evidence has been 
generated that the program reduces crime independent of police, but rather, the program 
does so in conjunction with police presence.24 To assume the program will reduce crime 
with a reduction of police presence would be unwarranted.   
Finally, it also seems sensible that the university provides implicit subsidies to the 
program. It is also unclear whether I have sufficiently itemized the full cost of the 
program. Use of school infrastructure, such as rooms and email services for advertising to 
students, may not be included in the costs of the BOSS program.   
Despite these concerns, the evidence suggests that the safe ride program has been 
an effective method of obtaining time and location specific reductions in crime for this 
particular university neighborhood. As this rough estimate seems to suggest, it appears to 
be a cost-effective alternative in comparison to adding officers to an existing police force.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
In this paper I examine a safe ride program operating in a major metropolitan 
area. Using fixed effect estimates in a Poisson regression, I find that an open safe ride 
program is associated with a reduction in the overall crime count of 14%. About half this 
impact becomes apparent only when recognizing the tendency of the policy makers to put 
the safe ride program into high crime hours and either using fixed effects, or dropping the 
hours in which the program never operates. A ZIP model confirms that 14% reduction in 
crime. The impacts of the program being open remains relatively homogeneous among 
days of the week and between different types crime.   
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It is further found that the crime count responds to the intensity of the safe ride 
program. As the program increases the rides delivered by one standard deviation, crime 
declines by more than 8%. Increasing the program's intensity is at least as effective at 
reducing violent crime as it is at reducing nonviolent crime. An increase in intensity 
appears to be more effective in reducing weekend crime than weekday crime.   
Using the estimate of 14% to generate a rough guess of the cost-effectiveness of 
the program, I find that the program accomplishes crime reduction in a cost-effective 
manner relative to expanding the police force. I recognize the limitation of this 
comparison but suggest that for the particular neighborhood examined that the program 
has been a relative success.  
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Chapter 2: University Provided Transit and Urban Crime 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Recent research demonstrates that “safe ride” programs, common to urban 
universities and hospitals, can reduce crime by providing taxi-like transport to students 
and staff (Weber 2014). Yet, safe rides are only one of a variety of transportation 
programs often provided by urban universities, and broader comparisons should be 
undertaken that take account of this mix. This paper examines reported neighborhood 
crime as a major private urban university supplements a large safe ride program with a 
dedicated and scheduled bus service along prime commuting routes.25 We find that the 
advent of the bus service reduces use of the safe-ride program. This raises the concern 
that the bus service may concentrate potential victims and crime along its fixed routes. 
Our difference-in-difference estimates show that the new bus service reduced crime in the 
campus neighborhood overall, and that the largest reductions were actually along the bus 
route.  
 While the details vary substantially, urban universities, major medical facilities 
and, to a lesser extent, private secondary schools frequently offer dedicated transport 
services. These services can be provided directly by the institution or they can be 
provided by private firms through contract. The private firm University Shuttle is 
representative when they argue in their promotional material that their services “improve 
campus safety and security” (University Shuttle 2014). The services can be designed to 
reduce drunk driving by providing trips to and from bars (Sacramento State University 
2014), or can consciously exclude such trips to focus on “preventing robbery and 
assaults” during trips between home and campus (Oregon State University 2014).   
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Critically, the services can be either safe rides with radio dispatched point-to-point 
service (essentially a taxi), or they can be scheduled shuttle services that stop at prime 
locations or along major commuting thoroughfares (essentially a bus). Often 
combinations of the two types of services are provided. Their interaction has not 
previously been examined. 
Our subject university had a large and well-used safe ride program that provided 
point-to-point service within an area that included an urban campus and the surrounding 
neighborhood dominated by student housing. After fifteen years of offering this service, 
the university augmented it with two regularly scheduled bus lines that cross the safe ride 
area on major thoroughfares.  This new option to transport students may reduce crime by 
lowering the number of students walking the neighborhood.  The bus service also 
creates additional eyes and ears that may increase the probability of crime 
detection, and reduce the expected profitability of crime.  Moreover, like all student 
transportation systems, the bus service may reduce crime committed by students 
themselves, who may be contained on the bus rather than disrupting others in the 
neighborhood (Weber 2014).  
Alternatively, as the safe ride program remained in operation, one might 
anticipate that the bus service substituted for this earlier program. Those taking the bus 
service do so instead of calling the safe ride service. Individuals that might otherwise 
wait inside for a safe ride and be taken to a destination, now walk to the bus route, wait 
for transport, and potentially walk again at the other end. To the extent that this 
substitution happens, those who use the service may be more vulnerable to crime.  
Moreover, the bus service brings together groups of students at known times to wait for, 
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or be dispersed from, the bus.  This could improve the ability of criminals to target 
students.  Thus, the advent of the bus service could increase crime, especially when 
substituting for the existing safe ride program. This increase in crime would be especially 
evident along the bus routes. 
 Our exploration of this issue fits with a long line of economic research on the 
relationship between public transit and crime. Becker (1968) presents the general 
argument that the amount of crime reflects its profitability. Subsequent researchers argue 
that transit availability and cost influence this profitability, although the influence is often 
ambiguous and depends on the particular circumstance. Lower cost transit can get 
potential victims off the street, but criminals may also use lower-priced transit to target 
victims or to expand their own search for victims. Critically, some forms of transit 
require waiting periods that may make riders vulnerable. For example, evidence from 
Chicago makes clear that commuter rail stations have particularly high rates of robberies 
(Bernasco and Block, 2011; Bernasco, et. al. 2013) and more sophisticated examination 
of crime counts shows a modest increase in neighborhood crime associated with the 
opening a new commuter rail station (Poister, 1996; Liggett, et. al. 2003).  Yet, there 
remains evidence to the contrary (Billings, et al. 2011) and one reason for these mixed 
results may be that criminals themselves use transit. Phillips and Sandler (2015) show 
that temporary closings of a commuter rail station reduces crime at neighboring stations 
as criminals have reduced access to the transit network.  Moreover, Ihlanfeldt (2003) 
presents earlier evidence that commuter rail is associated with increased crime in low 
income areas, but slightly decreased crime in high income areas. In addition to the 
quantity of crime, the type of crime may also be influenced by transit. Jackson and 
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Owens (2011) show that an expansion of hours for the DC subway decreased drunk 
driving crimes, but increased other types of alcohol-related crimes (such as assault).26   
The evidence directly on public bus transport is not as extensive. Qin (2013) 
provides descriptive evidence from Cincinnati showing elevated crime at bus stops. 
Loukaitou-Sideris (1996) provides earlier descriptive evidence that crime tends to cluster 
around popular but relatively isolated bus stops. It may not be the bus stop per se but 
rather that they are an example of infrastructure that causes congregations of people in 
public spaces (Loukaitou-Sideris, et. al. 2002). Evidence shows that police officers whose 
patrol routes were moved onto bus routes during a police initiative dramatically increased 
their number of arrests (Newton, et.al. 2004).  As is clear, these studies do not attempt to 
provide rigorous causal evidence. 
Survey evidence shows that riders on a dedicated university bus service report 
mixed sentiments regarding its influence on crime (Elam, et. al. 2006).  While some 
survey respondents felt it provided safer transport, others felt it encouraged drinking by 
students making them more susceptible to crime, or more likely to commit crime. This 
survey evidence reflects a bus service for a university without a safe ride program. Weber 
(2014) uses arguably exogenous changes in the hours of a public university safe ride 
service to show that when the program is open, crime is lowered. Thus, policy makers 
might worry about the advent of transportation alternatives that reduce the use of safe 
rides. We are the first to estimate the influence of adding a dedicated university bus 
service on reported crime, and we do so in a context in which an existing safe ride 
program serves the same population.  
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 In what follows, Section 2 details the case study describing the university, its 
neighborhood, and its transit programs. This section also describes the data that were 
collected. Section 3 presents the methodology used to investigate the influence of the new 
student bus service on university neighborhood crime.  The results are presented in 
Section 4.  The results show that the advent of bus service reduced the use of the safe ride 
program. Nonetheless, crime in the university neighborhood falls relative to the control.  
Despite the substitution between programs, the reduction in crime is actually 
concentrated along the bus routes. Section 5 provides a series of robustness checks and 
Section 6 concludes and suggests further research. 
 
2. Description of the Intervention and Data 
 
 The subject neighborhood surrounds Marquette University, an urban Catholic 
university on the west side of downtown Milwaukee Wisconsin that enrolls 
approximately 12,000 students. The campus blends into governmental and business 
buildings on its east side but on other sides is surrounded by residential neighborhoods 
that house students. These neighborhoods have relatively high crime rates. Historically, 
the university has undertaken a variety of initiatives to protect students including moving 
academic buildings and fraternities closer to the core of the campus, increasing housing 
immediately on campus and developing student transit programs.27  The safe ride 
program began in 1990 as the Local Intercampus Mobile Operation (LIMO).  The LIMO 
safe ride program continues to transport Marquette students, faculty and staff with valid 
ID within an area around campus, spanning a total area of about 60 blocks. A rider calls 
LIMO, a shuttle is sent the address and takes the rider to his or her destination.  Both the 
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pickup and destination must be within the 60 block boundary. The area of safe ride 
program is identified by darkened area in Figure 3.   
 Note that these boundaries have remained constant with one modest exception.  In 
September of 2008 the boundary was expanded to include two additional blocks 
identified by dark blue in Figure 3. This change reflected an increase in private student 
housing in those two blocks.  We will be careful to try a variety of robustness checks to 
account for this modest change, but find that our results are largely insensitive to how we 
deal with this expansion. We emphasize that our primary interest is how the advent of the 
bus service influences crime and the bus service does not go through or near the two 
blocks. Nonetheless, we explore the role of the expansion to make sure that it does not 
confound our findings. 
 The LIMO program runs daily around the year from 5pm-3am (5pm - 4am on 
academic weekends).  The program uses vans for transport and keeps one or more vans in 
reserve in case of break-downs or unusual demand.  The safe ride program averages 
around 5,000 rides a week across the entire year, both when school is in and out of 
session. It has shown substantial growth since its inception.  Indeed, the growing demand 
for safe ride services convinced the university it should augment it with a cheaper fixed-
route bus service.   
 The fixed route bus service began in March of 2008 and can again be used by 
students, faculty and staff with valid identification.  It consists of two routes which cross 
the width of the safe ride program area. Each route is a loop of about 1.5 to 2 miles in 
length. The routes do not trace the perimeter of the safe ride area but more nearly run 
through the heart of the area along arterial roads. The hours of the bus service exactly 
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match those of the safe ride program and it has seen substantial use.  Approximately 1000 
rides a week are provided by the dedicated bus service. 
As crime can exhibit both secular and cyclical patterns, we sought a control that 
most nearly matched our treatment jurisdiction.  While we show results using alternative 
controls, our primary control uses the only other university in the downtown area, the 
Milwaukee School of Engineering (MSOE).  The control neighborhood around MSOE is 
somewhat smaller in area but includes the Water Street entertainment district known for 
elevated crime. Like the area around Marquette the neighborhood includes residential 
areas with student housing and blends into the office and government buildings of 
downtown. MSOE enrolls around 3000 students and maintains a long-standing safe ride 
program that has serviced our control neighborhood throughout the study period.  
 
2.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics: 
 
 
 Weekly crime data comes from the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) through 
an online tool called COMPASS.28 The data includes the address of the crime, date and 
time of the crime and the broad type of crime. This service complements written records 
and has been available since January 2005. Critically, this predates the initiation of the 
bus service we examine.  It does, however, come well after the long-standing safe ride 
program.  Thus, this data allows studying the influence of the bus service on crime given 
the existence of the safe ride program. The records provide no personal information about 
victims or perpetrators.29 
 Using GIS software, the crime records are matched to geographical areas. The 
treatment area mimics the Marquette University safe ride service boundaries and the 
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control area mimics the MSOE safe ride service boundaries.  The areas include all legal 
parcels that are completely within or along the service boundaries.  The crime counts are 
the total weekly crime measured separately within the two respective areas. We face no 
issue of zero inflation as only a single observation has a crime count of zero across the 
entire time interval and both areas.  
As part of the objective is to examine the potential for crime relocating within the 
treatment safe ride area, we also make use of a geographic division within that area.  The 
area along the bus route is contrasted with the remainder of the safe ride area (again see 
Figure 3). To focus on the possibility of substitution we develop a bus route area that 
includes only those properties along the actual routes.  We later add the areas interior to 
the routes as a robustness check. The primary data window is roughly centered on the 
advent of the bus lines and runs from January 2005 to the January 2012.  Again, we alter 
this to test for robustness. 
 Weather data are collected as controls.  Weather may influence both the weekly 
demand for campus transit services and crime.  Certainly, it is well known that snow and 
cold temperatures are associated with lower rates of urban crime and, especially, robbery 
and other street crime (Falk, 1952; Anderson, 1989; Cohn, 1990; Jacob et al., 2004; 
Tompson and Bowers 2015). The weather indicators we collect are the minimum 
temperature for the week and the average daily snow on the ground for each week. These 
are taken from the nearest National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
weather station.  We experiment with a variety of alternative weather measures but with 
no real change in the pattern of results. Additional controls identify the three terms of the 
academic calendar for each university as classes being in session may also influence both 
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rides and crime (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003).30 Again, we note the transit services runs year 
round. 
 Finally, for some specifications we will be interested in the actual ride data from 
Marquette University. We know the number of rides given each week in both the safe 
ride program and on the bus route.  These, and the remainder of descriptive statistics, are 
shown in Table 12 and we note that there are about 45 crimes per week averaged across 
the Marquette university neighborhood.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
The primary research objective is to determine the influence of the bus service on 
crime in the urban neighborhood around Marquette University. The secondary objective 
is to examine the possible relocation of crime within the treated university neighborhood. 
In examining this secondary objective, we initially show that the new bus service 
corresponds with a decrease in the number of safe rides given. This fuels our inquiry of 
the impact of the bus service on crime and the distribution of that crime.  
To examine the policy influence we estimate a series of difference-in-difference 
estimates that compare the weekly crime counts before and after the bus service. These 
first compare crime in the treated university neighborhood to crime in the control 
neighborhood, as the new bus service is added to the existing safe ride program in the 
treated neighborhood.  This gives rise to a traditional difference-in-difference 
specification: 
 =  +   ∗ 	 +   ∗ 	 ∗ ℎ!	ℎ		 + " ∗
ℎ!	ℎ		 +  # ∗ 		$ +            (1) 
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in which the dependent variable is the crime count in neighborhood i at time t.  In our 
initial specification, the treated neighborhood is the entire Marquette University safe ride 
area, and for inference robust standard errors are used (Bertrand, et al. 2002). 
The specification includes three types of controls. First, crime varies with weather 
and so the weekly average snow on the ground (mm) and weekly minimum temperature 
(°C) are included. Second, crime can vary in the neighborhoods with the class schedule of 
the relevant university (Weber 2014). To account for this the weeks in which each of the 
three academic terms meet for each university are included as dummies and interacted 
with the neighborhood.31 Third, we directly address the likely cycles and trends by 
including 51 weekly time dummies and a time trend. The focus in the initial specification 
is the magnitude and significance of β2, which measures the impact of the policy on the 
treated Marquette University neighborhood relative to the control. 
 We next break down the difference-in-difference estimate to contrast crime along 
the new bus lines directly with crime in the control. This is augmented by contrasting the 
crime in the safe ride area, but not along the bus lines, directly with crime in the control. 
Finally, we examine crime exclusively within the treated neighborhood to determine if 
the new bus service shifted the location of crime toward the bus line routes.  A series of 
robustness exercises are then presented. 
 Figure 4 compares a simple moving average of the crime counts for the treated 
Marquette University neighborhood with crime in the MSOE control neighborhood. The 
vertical line indicates the introduction of the new bus service.  The figure shows the 
cycles over the year that we control for in our estimates, as crime routinely increases 
during fall and spring weeks.  The Marquette university area has routinely higher crime 
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counts than the control, but is also a larger geographic area. The spline functions show 
crime counts fall substantially in the treated neighborhood after the introduction of the 
bus service and become more nearly similar to the counts in the control.  Other than this 
decline, there appears to be no secular pattern in the crime counts in the treated 
neighborhood. There does appear to be a slight downward trend in counts for the control 
neighborhood, causing us to explore differential trends in our estimation.  
     While the visual evidence in Figure 4 suggests that crime declines with the advent 
of the bus line in the treated neighborhood relative to the control, it presents no evidence 
on the statistical significance of that decline or on the possible concentration of crime 
along the bus routes. We now turn to the statistical evidence on these issues. 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
To set the stage for our investigation we examine whether the new bus service 
may have reduced the number of students using the safe ride program. We note that the 
growing use of the safe ride program and the associated growth in expenses was a stated 
factor in introducing the bus service. In Table 13 the number of rides provided weekly is 
regressed against a simple time trend and the advent of the bus service. In this basic 
specification the advent of the bus service is associated with a decline in ridership for the 
safe ride program of about 1700 rides per week, about 35 percent of the average weekly 
rides. The results in column 2 control for our explanatory variables and those in column 3 
also add weekly dummies.  These additions do not meaningfully change the estimated 
magnitude.  The 1700 fewer weekly rides provided by the safe ride program may well 
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have saved money but it also raises concerns over an association between the advent of 
the bus service, reduced safe rides and crime.  
 Issues of crime relocation can be tricky. On the one hand, the bus may 
concentrate victims along the route as discussed.  Yet, the reduction in demand for the 
safe-rides may actually improve its influence on crime in those regions far away from the 
bus route.  With many students taking the bus, the waiting time for such more distant safe 
rides could be shortened actually increasing the number of such more distant rides.  Thus, 
at the same time that one might anticipate more waiting outside and walking near the bus 
routes, there could simultaneously be less walking in the more remote areas. To the 
extent that either of these are true, the distribution of crime could move away from distant 
areas toward the bus line. This shift could remain true even as overall crime declines. 
The first column of Table 14 presents the simple difference-in-difference estimate 
of the influence of the new bus line on crime in the treated neighborhood, relative to the 
control neighborhood. The coefficient on the interaction indicates that crimes decline by 
about 6 a week in the treatment neighborhood.  Using the robust standard error, this is 
highly significant. As the mean crime level before the bus service was about 45 crimes 
per week, this represents a large reduction of about 13 percent. The other estimates in that 
column show that the treatment area tends to have higher crime counts (Figure 4) and that 
the period after the policy has slightly lower crime counts.  
Column 2 adds controls for weather and for school sessions. There are three terms 
for each university interacted with neighborhood as the term dates are not identical. The 
coefficients on the controls indicate that crime is lowest in the summer when there are 
fewer students and highest in the fall and winter terms, when students are plentiful. The 
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arrival of new students, who are not yet accustomed to the neighborhood and campus life, 
may be responsible for the comparatively higher crime in fall (Weber 2014). Reflecting 
the typical pattern, crime declines in inclement weather as indicated by the significant 
positive on temperature. The inclusion of these relevant controls does not change the 
estimated influence of the bus service in reducing crime. Column 3 adds 51 weekly 
dummies to capture the evident cyclicality, and to recognize that crime may vary with 
holidays or events in the school calendar. A variety of the individual week coefficients 
take significance and the entire vector of weekly controls is jointly significant at a 10 
percent level.  Critically, their inclusion leaves the difference-in-difference coefficient 
largely unchanged. Moreover, replacing weekly controls with broader monthly controls 
also results in no meaningful change in the policy estimate. 
There appeared to be a modest secular decline in the crime count for the control 
that was not evident in the treatment.  We show in column 4 that a single time trend takes 
a negative but insignificant coefficient and leaves the influence of the bus service 
unchanged.  Allowing a differential time trend in column 5 shows that the negative trend 
for the control neighborhood is statistically significant and offset by a positive (but 
insignificant) coefficient for the treatment neighborhood. The differential trend model not 
only fits the data better but it generates a substantial movement in the estimated policy 
influence. The advent of the new bus line now emerges as much more important. The 
estimate now indicates that following the new bus service crimes in the treatment 
neighborhood fell by over 11 crimes per week.32  This is a 24 percentage point decline in 
crime counts in the treatment neighborhood. 
39 
 
We recognize the count nature of the dependent variable and in Table 24, 
Appendix B, show a variety of alternative specifications.  We estimate the log of the 
count, the Poisson estimate and the negative binomial.  These are each compared to the 
linear specification shown in the first column.  The 24 percent reduction shown in that 
first column is matched by a significant 27 percent reduction in the log estimate and very 
similar magnitudes in the Poisson and negative binomial.  While the latter suggests there 
is significant underdispersion, the estimated difference-in-difference coefficient is 
virtually identical in the Poisson and in the negative binomial. We again note there is 
only one week with zero crimes and that inflation is not an issue. For ease of 
interpretation we continue to present the linear results but note that none of the critical 
findings are altered when using these alternatives. 
Table 15 examines the influence of the new bus service on crime along the bus 
route area and within the remainder of safe ride area.  It contrasts each of these areas with 
the control neighborhood. The first column reproduces the final column of Table 14 
showing the significant decline within the entire treatment neighborhood.  The second 
column focuses on the crime in the treatment neighborhood that is along the bus routes 
and reveals a significant decline of 7 crimes per week relative to the control. Thus, there 
appears to be no evidence that the bus route has concentrated crime.  Instead, it seems 
that the additional eyes and ears of the bus lines have outweighed the potential hazards of 
additional waiting and the concentration of potential victims. There is no evidence from 
this estimate that safety concerns are warranted at least for this small scale neighborhood 
transit program.   
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The final column in Table 15 examines the remainder of the safe ride 
neighborhood away from the bus route. As we have suggested, the new bus route has a 
potentially ambiguous influence on crime in this area. The estimate in the final column 
suggests an insignificant decline of between 4 and 5 crimes per week relative to the 
control. At minimum, there is no evidence that crime has increased and the suggestion 
that the safe-ride program can concentrate on more remote services and lower crime 
remains a possibility.  Viewed this way, the more than 11 crime reduction in the 
treatment neighborhood could be seen as divided with approximately 7 of those 
happening along the bus route and the remainder in the safe-ride only area. 
Table 16 directly compares crime along the bus routes to that in the safe ride only 
area. We do not suggest that the safe ride only area is a control.  Indeed, we have 
explicitly recognized that crime in both areas are likely to be influenced by the policy.  
Instead, these estimates are simply designed as another examination of whether or not 
crime in the treatment area has been concentrated along the bus routes.  The first column 
indicates that post policy period has lower crime across the entire Marquette University 
neighborhood as the previous estimates (relative to the control) have suggested. 
Critically, the estimate indicates there is no statistical difference in the influence of the 
policy on the two regions within the neighborhood.  In short, there is no evidence that 
relative location of crime has changed with the advent of the bus service. Adding 
additional controls for weather, school sessions, and weeks of the year does not change 
this uniformity in the policy's impact. Similarly, accounting for expansion and time 
trends makes very little difference.33 The estimates in Table 16 show that the new bus 
routes have not concentrated crime. 
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5. Robustness and Heterogeneity 
 
We now conduct a series of robustness checks and examine for heterogeneous 
treatment influences. The first column of Table 17 simply reproduces the key results from 
the previous section showing a decline of more than 11 weekly crimes in the treatment 
neighborhood relative to the control.  It also shows the absence of any evidence that 
crime becomes concentrated along the bus route.  
The second column reproduces the same series of estimates but imagines a false 
treatment date one year prior to the policy. If long term factors other than the bus service 
cause crime to be failing in the treatment neighborhood, one might anticipate that the 
false treatment date will perform similarly to the actual treatment date.  The coefficient 
on the false policy date for the treatment neighborhood is insignificantly different from 
that in the control.  Moreover, there is no evidence with the false treatment date that 
crime fell along the bus route. Indeed, the critical coefficients are insignificant in all 
specifications. This result suggests that the significance of the true policy is not 
coincidental.  As a further check, the third column uses a false treatment date of one year 
after the actual policy date.  Again, there is no evidence of any influence providing 
further reassurance. 
The fourth column of Table 17 examines the impact of adding two lead periods, 
one for six-months before the policy and a second for a year to six months before the 
policy.  These lead periods are also interacted with the treatment area, and capture any 
variation in crime that occurs prior to the introduction of the bus service. The interactions 
are typically insignificant but more importantly including the new variables never 
materially changes the estimated policy influence. Despite the leads, the bus service still 
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significantly reduces crime by about 11 counts per week. There remains no evidence of 
crime concentrating along the bus routes. The decrease in crime along the routes remains 
significant and of roughly similar size.  The inclusion of the leads highlights the 
possibility raised earlier that the bus service could also reduce crime in the safe ride only 
area by freeing up this service for more distant users. The reduction in crime counts for 
the safe ride only area looks similar to that along the bus route. 
The fifth column of Table 17 adopts an entirely different control neighborhood. 
While the area around another university near downtown (our preferred control) is in 
many ways more comparable, we complement it with a control that has no university 
avoiding issues of academic calendars and the possibility that MSOE undertook actions 
we are not aware of that kept crime constant. The Bay View neighborhood on 
Milwaukee’s south side consists disproportionately of younger residents, many just out of 
college. At the same time it is not a typical neighborhood for college students to live in (it 
is more than four miles away) suggesting that it is independent of the transit decisions of 
Marquette. Again, we use the start of the bus service as the policy period and compare 
crime within the treated neighborhood to that in Bay View. The estimates indicate that 
the policy generates a large and significant decline of 15 crimes per week in the treatment 
neighborhood.34 There is a significant decline in crime along the bus route and, again, no 
evidence of crime concentrating along the bus route. As we have seen in some earlier 
specifications, there is a modestly significant reduction in crime in the safe ride only area.  
In short, the change of control neighborhoods reinforces our earlier evidence that the bus 
service is effective in reducing crime both in the overall neighborhood and along its 
route. 
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Table 18 provides additional robustness checks. Again, the first column shows the 
primary results from Tables 14, 15 and 17. Column 2 recognizes that some reported 
crimes are unlikely to be influenced by the bus service.  These potentially irrelevant 
crimes include such things as counterfeiting, embezzlement and wire fraud.35 While there 
are relatively few reports of such crimes in the university neighborhood, it seems that 
they should not vary with the advent of the bus service. When dropping potentially 
irrelevant offences, the estimated influence of the bus service remains virtually identical. 
The new service remains associated with a significant reduction of 11 crimes per week in 
the entire neighborhood and 7 crimes a week along the bus route. There continues to be 
no evidence of crime concentrating along the routes. 
Column 3 considers the potential relevance of the modest expansion to the safe 
ride program. While the previous estimates simply omit crimes in the expansion (two 
blocks at the northern boundary of the treatment neighborhood), here we include the 
crime occurring in the expansion area. The expansion occurred in September of 2010, 
sixteen months after the start of the bus service.  If we leave the specification unchanged 
but simply count all crimes in the expansion area over the study period, the result remains 
a significant decline of 13.5 crimes per week in the expanded university neighborhood 
relative to the control. This larger reduction occurs on modestly larger base of 49 crimes 
per week. The slightly larger decline reflects a decline of the original magnitude along 
the bus route and a larger decline in safe ride only area which included the expansion. As 
a second test, we include a separate control for the post-expansion period.  This returns 
an unchanged reduction of 13.5 crimes per week. Finally, we augment this second 
specification with an interaction of the expansion period dummy and the treatment 
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neighborhood.  The coefficient on the new interaction is negative and that on the 
expansion dummy is essentially zero.  The resulting decline in crimes associated with the 
bus service grows to approximately 17 per week but there remains no evidence of crime 
concentrating along the bus route.36 
Column 4 presents estimates that enlarge the definition of the bus routes to 
include all area interior to the routes. This highlights the possibility that the area encircled 
by the bus service receives important treatment. It divides the university neighborhood 
into two contiguous regions. This redefinition provides only modest changes. Obviously 
the overall influence on the entire treatment neighborhood is unchanged. The newly 
enlarged bus area shows a negative and significant reduction of 9 crimes a week. The 
reduced safe ride area again shows an insignificant reduction of about 4 crimes a week.  
The policy reduces crime and seems to especially do so near the bus service.  
Several efforts were made to examine heterogeneous treatment impacts. We 
explored whether there existed different influences during hot and cold weather but could 
not identify such a difference.  Similarly, we found no distinct differences based on snow 
cover or by academic term. We recognize that additional treatment heterogeneity mays 
exist by type of rider (women vs. men for example).  Unfortunately, the crime data does 
not record personal information such as gender or age.  Moreover, the bus service does 
not track the characteristics of its users.  
We did, however, find substantial differences in the policy influence by day of the 
week. Table 19 provides a separate estimate for Friday night, Saturday and Sunday and 
compares that to an estimate for the remainder of the week. This comparison suggests 
that the policy impact is concentrated on the weekend. Indeed, the vast majority of the 
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overall reduction in crimes (approximately 76 percent) happens in the weekend despite 
being a smaller share of the week.  This could make sense if students use the service for 
weekend leisure activities (including drinking) and this is when they are most vulnerable. 
In fact, Playboy magazine awarded Marquette University the dubious honor of the "Best 
Catholic Party University" (Playboy 2010) suggesting that this particular leisure activity 
may be common. The results in Table 19 also suggest that crime decreases both along the 
bus route and in the safe ride area during the weekend but provide no evidence of 
significant declines during the weekdays. In sum, this argues that the new bus service 
does not help provide safer transit to and from classes but could be critical for transport 
associated with social activities.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We uniquely examine the influence of a dedicated university bus route on 
neighborhood crime.  The advent of the bus route led to a significant drop in weekly 
crime relative to the control. This suggests that the bus kept students off the streets at 
times when they were vulnerable and acts as additional eyes and ears. Critically, the bus 
substituted for the long-standing safe ride program as fewer safe rides were given with 
the advent of the bus service. Recognizing the advantage of the door-to-door safe ride, we 
worried that a more dangerous transport mode replaced a safer one.  Yet, we found no 
evidence of this despite previous suggestions in the literature.  Instead, the reduction in 
crime is actually centered along the bus routes.  This may reflect the fact that while some 
students use the bus instead of the safe ride, others use the bus instead of walking.  
Indeed, despite the substitution, the total number of students transported by both 
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programs increases after the advent of the bus service.  Moreover, the bus may come 
sufficiently frequently that wait times are minimal and walking distances are short so that 
vulnerability does not increase.   
The evidence on the influence of the bus service on the safe-ride only area is 
mixed.  The estimated policy influence was routinely negative but significantly so only in 
some specifications.  It remains clear that the substitution toward bus rides did not cause 
crime to increase in the safe ride area only.  The suggestions that the bus service might 
have actually decreased crime in the safe ride only area (say on the weekends) could 
follow if the bus service freed additional safe ride capacity for those farthest away and 
perhaps most vulnerable.  Nonetheless, the critical point is that there was no evidence of 
crime concentrating geographically as a result of new policy. 
This pattern proved robust to a long series of robustness checks. The estimates 
correctly lost significance when we considered false treatment dates either before or after 
the true start date of the bus service. In contrast, the addition of lead periods, as well as an 
alternative choice of control, did not substantially alter the results.  Continued checks 
revealed that the results remain robust to a narrower definition of crime and to broader 
definitions of both the university area (which includes expansions) and the treatment area 
within the bus route. Despite these many changes, the pattern of results consistently 
shows a reduction in crime in the Marquette University neighborhood after the addition 
of the bus service.  There also continued to be no evidence that crime became more 
concentrated along the bus routes.  The influence of the bus service on crime does appear 
to be concentrated on weekends when students are more likely to use transit for social 
activities.  
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Chapter 3: Modeling Adversary Preference and Strategic Response 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The notion that terrorism may well be a rational act has found strong support in 
the rational choice literature (Landes 1978, Pape 2003, Sandler 2013). In this research, 
we share the view that adversaries are rational actors, and therefore at least some parts of 
their attack strategy can be predicted. Moving towards that goal, we create a parametrized 
model describing the behavior of two rational agents in conflict. We then fit that model to 
data by a simple calibration technique. This gives us a broad picture of the otherwise 
invisible effort by both sides, and a measure of the otherwise unknown ex ante difficulty 
of conventional and unconventional attacks. While previous work has estimated the de 
facto status of terrorists as either in a “high attack regime” or “low attack regime” 
(Enders and Sandler 2002), or changes in intensity of attacks (Faria 2003, Faria and Arce 
2012), this model provides an explanation of how a group may actually switch from one 
type of attack to another.  Using this model, the importance of military intelligence (Arce 
and Sandler 2007) can be measured. This calibrated model estimates casualties when a 
well-informed adversary has unusually high rates of success, or succeeds in carrying out 
particularly lethal attack against a less informed defending nation. 
The key to our modeling and calibration is that uncertainty is central to conflict. 
For example, it is uncertain if an attack will succeed or fail.37 Even if an attack was 
guaranteed success, the number of casualties is uncertain until after the fact. It is clear 
from historical evidence that some attacks have been devastating, and casualties from 
adversary attacks follow heavy tail distributions (Mohtadi and Murshid 2006, 2009a, 
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2009b; Bohorquez, et. al. 2009, Newman, 2005, Clauset et. al. 2007). Others may not. 
We carefully take into account both of these types of uncertainty. 
We begin by describing the conflict model, and discussing its components and 
solutions. We examine the parameters of the model: effort by both sides, and the 
complexity (i.e., intrinsic difficulty) of each type of attack. We show that when initial 
parameters are changed, participants respond in manner consistent with a priori 
expectations. Taking this as a sign of plausibility, we then examine two sources of data 
about adversary attack damages created by the University of Maryland's START Center. 
The first dataset, Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN by Non-State Actors Database 
(POICN), stresses a key category of attacks that have the potential to be extreme and 
catastrophic. The complementing second dataset, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 
stresses attacks that are more conventional in nature, but nevertheless have the potential 
to be large. This categorical distinction between different types of attack motivates using 
two different distributions in our modeling and calibration exercise. Since both datasets 
are used to jointly calibrate a single model, a key issue is the compatibility of the two 
dataset. After greater discussion of both types of attacks, and the key features of each of 
the datasets, we find a subset of the data to be comparable, calibrate the model to fit the 
data.  
In what follows, Section 2 develops the model, discusses each of the critical 
unknowns that need to be evaluated, and presents comparative statics.  Section 3 
discusses the data set, and walks readers through critical features of each data set. Section 
4 uses the data to identify the distribution for each type of large attack, and estimates the 
defining parameters. Section 5 then calibrates the entire conflict model to these 
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distributions, and shows the resulting set of anticipated behaviors, attack obstacles, and 
quality of fit. Section 6 presents predicted casualties when attacks parameters are poorly 
anticipated and prepared for by the defender. Two parameters of focus are attacks with 
greater lethality than expected, or those with greater ease for the adversary than 
anticipated by the government.  We model these through shocks unanticipated by the 
defending government. Section 7 presents concluding remarks. 
 
2. Model 
 
2.1 General Model Overview 
 
The model characterizes a strategic interaction between an adversary and the 
government. The two principal forms of substantial attacks that we are interested in, 
unconventional attacks (CBRN), and conventional attacks (non-CBRN), capture the 
nature of strategic trade-off that may be confront an adversary.  An adversary who carries 
out a substantial conventional attack faces a certain risk of failure and a distribution of 
casualties in the event of success.  The adversary’s alternate strategy is a substantial 
unconventional attack (CBRN), with its own distinct profile of failure risk and casualty.  
Two factors influence the probability of failure in either attack type.   First, the 
government establishes defensive efforts to protect against attacks. In keeping with the 
conclusions of the 9/11 report (Roth et al., 2004), it seems likely that the adversary 
observes the government’s protective effort level, perhaps by observing the extent of 
protection of targets. Second, there are potential inherent complexities that represent 
logistical, terrain, informational, and coordination obstacles associated with any attack. 
This complexity is independent of the government and the adversary effort. Both 
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government defensive efforts, and the complexity factors, compound to lower the chance 
of a successful attack. We assume that the complexity of the operation is common 
knowledge to participants (though we as researchers had to estimate it via calibration to 
actual data).  We later allow for adversary to have superior knowledge of the complexity 
of an operation relative to the government, indicating the value of intelligence to the 
government. 
Observing government counterinsurgency effort, the adversary chooses its 
optimal effort as a best response and the level of attack associated with a specific inherent 
complexity.  The government chooses optimal levels of protective effort against each 
type of attack, given budgetary constraints, and keeping the reactions of the adversary in 
mind.38 Previous literature has examined budget choice as a part of the conflict (Zhuang 
and Bier, 2007), but here we consider budgets as a fixed and important limiting factor, 
such as by Congressional decision at the start of a fiscal year. At the end of the game, 
payoffs are given, and the game ends. Figure 5 shows a flowchart outlining the basic 
pattern of the game: 
This flowchart shows how CBRN and conventional attacks fit into the model. 
Government allocates its resources to defend against the two types of attack.  Adversaries 
see the government’s choice, and then allocate their own resources. The attack then has a 
possibility of being successful, contingent on the compounding factors of each parties’ 
effort, and the natural complexity of the attack type. Successful attacks lead to benefits 
for the adversary, and losses for the government, in the form of casualties.  
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2.2 Critical Unknowns 
To account for the uncertain nature of conflict, we have included two critical 
factors into our model: number of casualties from each type of attack, and probabilities of 
success in each type of attack.  Each unknown will be estimated by our empirical 
approach. We discuss each in turn.  
As a first unknown, the true importance of an attack is only clear once an attack 
has been realized. Participants begin conflict with an expectation about the value of an 
attack. This valuation will be found in the respective utility functions of each party. We 
admit such valuations or payoff may be argued to include casualties, property damage, or 
other intangible assets. In our case, we will focus on casualties, the sum of fatalities and 
injuries, since we anticipate human life and health to be a dominant feature of such 
evaluations, and do not wish to engage in the comparability of human life to other assets. 
We again point out that these damages are likely to have heavy tails (Mohtadi and 
Murshid, 2009). The expected number of casualties given that an attack is successful is 
represented by the weight %&'(), %+,-. for the two types of attack. Put explicitly, 
% = /0$1$|31$$41567                                       (1) 
Until section 6, we will assume shared expectations about fatalities,  
/0%| 58$7 = /0%| 9	87                                      (2) 
As a second set of unknowns, different effort levels correspond to different 
probabilities of success.  A priori, the effort of each party interacts with the effort of their 
opponent, and further interacts with natural complexities inherent to performing an 
attack.  All else equal, the probability of success will increase with adversary effort 
0&'(), +,-.7, and decline with the preventive efforts of the government 0&'(), +,-.7. 
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Some attacks may be notably challenging, such as coordinating multiple shooters. More 
challenging attacks require greater logistical precision, or greater luck. As a consequence, 
they are less likely to succeed than a simpler attack at a comparative level of effort. Such 
attacks are marked as having a higher “complexity” 0&'(), +,-.7. We assume that the 
government’s assessment of is accurate until section 6, where we consider the case that 
it is wrongly assessed. 
We note that estimation of the parameters determining probability of success 
0&'(), +,-., &'(), +,-. , &'(), +,-.7 is particularly challenging. The desired 
information is often either unknown or deliberately obscured.    Adversary effort is 
deliberately hidden from the government and consequently to any researcher. Conversely, 
the government effort may also be unknown to the adversary (and researcher). For 
example, even the US Coast guard randomizes its surveillance and counter-insurgency 
efforts (Ordónez, et. al., 2013). In principle such mixed strategies are not without merit, 
as they keep the opponent uncertain.   However, since one important contribution of this 
work is to shed light on the value of better intelligence about the adversary’s potential 
actions, to the government, it is more relevant to focus on uncertainty about the adversary 
actions to the government than vice-versa.   In the following section, we develop a model 
in which we can infer the underlying effort levels of the participants, especially the 
adversary, by matching theoretical variables with counterparts in actual data. 
Our model, therefore, must address the eight critical unknowns of government 
effort 0&'(), +,-.7, adversary effort 0&'(), +,-.7, target complexity 0&'(), +,-.7, 
and finally the damages of successful substantial attacks 0%&'(), %+,-.7. 
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2.3 Probability of Successful Attack 
We now combine the above components of an attack into a single probabilistic 
form. In our model, the probability of success at type of attack  =
{;<, 	8	}, is modeled by: 
0(, (, (7 = >1 − ABCDC E FGHCICJ                                       (3) 
This value can also be interpreted as the probability of damage from attack type n.  
In keeping with previous literature, we will use the probability of success terminology 
throughout this paper (Bier and Hausken, 2011), and the exponential functional form 
matches the example of Biers, et al (2007).  For an attack to succeed, the adversary must 
trigger a successful attack, as shown by the first part of the product, and the government 
must fail to defend, as shown in the second part of the product.  The common parameter 
 is both attack-augmenting and defense-augmenting, since it is clear that logistical 
challenges affect both parties, assisting the government and obstructing the adversary.39  
Granting the assumptions that effort and complexity are positive, (, (, ( ≥ 0, 
this probability has the basic properties we would expect. To begin with, at no point does 
this probability rise above one or fall below zero. Next, all else being held fixed, the 
typical comparative statics are clear and intuitive. First, attacks are more likely to succeed 
with greater adversary effort MNO0P,I,H7NP ≥ 0Q. Appropriately, in the boundary case where 
adversary effort is zero, the probability of a successful attack is also zero. Second, attacks 
are less likely to succeed with greater government effort MNO0P,I,H7NI ≤ 0Q, but no finite 
amount of government effort can force the probability of successful attack to zero. Last 
of all, attacks are less likely to succeed as target complexity increases MNO0P,I,H7NH ≤ 0Q. As 
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 → ∞, the probability of successful attack approaches zero. Again, we note that none of 
these values (, (, ( are available to us as raw data. Instead, we only know 0. 7, the 
probability of success in the real world. 
We expect that rational actors would perform some mental estimate of the 
probabilities of success in their decision-making process. Our model hinges on the belief 
that adversaries will attempt to maximize the expected casualties from both conventional 
and CBRN attacks. Conversely, the government will attempt to minimize these 
casualties. We use the structure of our model, and our information about  0. 7 to provide 
an estimate of the many unknowns. 
 
2.4 Adversary Behavior  
 
We assume that a hostile adversary will have the goal of maximizing casualties, 
given some resource constraints. Rational adversaries will keep in mind their probability 
of success, 0. 7, for each type of attack, and have conditional expectations, about the 
mean number of casualties from a successful attack. We assume that these expectations 
coming from equation 1 enter into the utility function of the adversary and later, the 
government. As such, their expected utility function is the expected number of casualties 
from their efforts:40 
/0VP7 = %&'()0&'(), &'(), &'()7 + %+,-.0+,-., +,-. , +,-.7      (4) 
This is subject to the simple expenditure restriction: 
P = &'() + +,-.                                                       (5) 
We assume that the government acts as a Stackelberg leader. We justify this 
assumption by noting many strategic decisions made by the government, are visible to the 
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adversary. Such examples may be airport scanners, additional patrol boats, or improving 
firearms for security guards (Ordónez, et al. 2013). We first solve for the best response 
function of the adversary.  This is derived in Appendix C, and is found to be: 
&'()∗ 0&'(), +,-.7 = W(>XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[EGIYZC[HYZC[`I\]^_H\]^_` aBD\]^_bDYZC[` bD\]^_            (6) 
We assume that the resource constraint is binding, since additional resources serve no 
other purpose in our model other than investing in attacks. Thus, the remainder of the 
resources are spent on CBRN type attacks:  +,-.∗ 0&'(), +,-.7 = P −
&'()∗ 0&'(), +,-.7. For simplicity and no loss of generality adversary resources are 
normalized to unity. This allows us to focus on using variations in  to generate the 
observed probability of success. 
 
2.5 Interpreting the Adversary’s Best Response Function  
The best response function for an attack implies the following effects, all else being held 
constant (see Appendix C equations C9-C14): 
NP∗YZC[NcYZC[ ≥ 0, NP∗YZC[NIYZC[ ≤ 0, NP∗YZC[NHYZC[ ⪌ 0                                             (7) 
NP∗\]^_Nc\]^_ ≥ 0, NP∗\]^_NI\]^_ ≤ 0, NP∗\]^_NH\]^_ ⪌ 0                                           (8) 
The first two derivatives, for % and  are as one would expect for a simple game.41 To 
illustrate each of the three cases, consider the reactions of adversary effort in the case of 
conventional weapon attacks. First, the adversary would increase effort if the expected 
casualties from a successful attack increased, say from improved explosive technology or 
access to superior firearms training. Second, if the government counterinsurgency effort 
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increased exogenously, it would decrease the adversary effort to attack the overly 
defended site.  
The third result, for , shows that a reduction in complexity can direct the 
adversary in either direction. If the attack experienced lower executional complexity, say 
by the development of a new explosive or concealed firearm, it could increase adversary 
effort by promise of success, or decrease effort by allowing effort to be diverted to other 
sites. Recall that both types of attack are linked through the resource constraints. As a 
consequence, substitution can occur between the two types of attack.  
Noting that P − &'()∗ = +,-.∗ , the complementary results hold for the “cross 
effects” of attacks: 
NP∗YZC[Nc\]^_ ≤ 0, NP∗YZC[NI\]^_ ≥ 0, NP∗YZC[NH\]^_ ⪌ 0                                        (9) 
NP∗YZC[NcYZC[ ≤ 0, NP∗YZC[NIYZC[ ≥ 0, NP∗YZC[NHYZC[ ⪌ 0                                       (10) 
 The key subtlety remains the impact of complexity, . The direction of this 
impact is ambiguous.  The intuition is as follows: if the first type of attack becomes 
complex or simple enough, the marginal benefit of adversary effort becomes small, as the 
outcome for that type of attack is almost certain. This leaves a relative excess of 
resources to expend on the alternative (second) attack. As a result, the direction of impact 
for delta is not monotonic and depends on parameter values M NPYZC[NH\]^_ ⪌ 0Q .  A critical 
implication of this finding is that an increase in the complexity of one type of attack 
offers little comfort to the government, as it may encourage adversary to pursue 
alternative attack strategies that may be even more deadly (Bier, et al. 2007).  
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Finally, the Appendix C confirms the adversary’s second order condition is 
always satisfied for positive values of parameters %, , , ,  > 0, assuring the 
optimality of the solutions. 
 
2.6 Government Defensive Behavior  
The government is interested in impeding the progress of the adversary. It moves 
first in the context of the game, acting as a Stackelberg leader, establishing defenses prior 
to the attack. We will assume that the actions of the government, and therefore, the 
probability of success or failure is public knowledge. This probability enters both directly 
as shown below in the government objective function as well as indirectly through the 
adversary response function. The government would like to maximize its expected utility 
as follows:42 
/0VI7 = %&'()01 − 0&'(), &'(), &'()77 + %+,-.01 − 0+,-., +,-., +,-.77 
 (11) 
Note that the government is assumed to share the same weight on the importance of an 
attack with the adversary, w, i.e., the conditional expectation of an attack, given it that it 
is successful. Naturally, the greater this weight is the larger in both party’s interest in the 
attack, one is producing it, the other in deterring it.  
The government action is naturally also subject to constraints on its expenditures: 
I = &'() + +,-.                                                     (12) 
We find that the fit is best with assuming government expenditures, I = 1.43 As 
might be expected, the solution to government maximization problem is more complex, 
owing to the inclusion of ∗, the adversary’s best response. As a consequence of 
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including ∗ in the governments’ behavior, the governments’ behavior does not reduce to 
a simple behavior in δ or w.  Due to the intractability of the equation, we simply solve for 
g* numerically in each instance.    
For the relevant cases, we find that the second order condition is satisfied and we 
have a maximum. Thus, the players do not have incentive to deviate from their behavior 
and the resulting equilibrium is Nash.  The equation for the first order condition is shown 
in Appendix C (equation C20), as is the second order condition (equation C21).  
In Figure 6, a graph of the numerical estimates of their behavior is shown below 
for a neighborhood of values near the suspected equilibrium. We begin by first displaying 
the equilibrium efforts by both parties in the conventional types of attacks, in a region of 
f&'()varying from 1 to 10, and holding f+,-. constant at 2.  The value of %&'()=66.7 
and %+,-.=168.5 are determined later from actual data, and we assume both sides have 
unitary resources.  In the neighborhood of our best estimate, we find that increasing the 
complexity of conventional attacks results in a reduction of effort for the adversary.  The 
reduction in effort by the adversary is matched by a similar reduction in effort by the 
government. We note that any attack with a complexity greater than 8 is left essentially 
undefended by the government. To provide a grounding for a complexity measure of 8 
for the adversary, one could imagine an adversary devoting its entire effort to the attack 
since the government does nothing and the site is undefended.  Yet, evaluating P(.), 
equation 3, with these aformentiond assumptions,  = 1,  = 0,  = 8, would provide 
only  about a 12% chance of success. Thus the optimal level of adversary effort at 
conventional attacks will be indeed far less than unity, and the adversary’s chance of 
successful conventional attacks for the equilibrium level of effort will be only near 3%.   
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We next consider how changes in CBRN attack complexity changes the effort at 
conventional sites in Figure 7, the cross-attack complexity.  We use similar regions, this 
time varying f+,-. from 1 to 10, and holding f&'() constant at 2.  The value of 
%&'()=66.7 and %+,-.=168.5 remain as before. To gain a better understanding of this 
result, we note that the basic principle at work here is one of strategy substitution: the 
government exerts no effort defending conventional attacks when the more lethal CBRN 
alternative has a a very low level difficulty of 1 (not shown here).  To put such an attack 
into perspective, this attack would be so easy that a government could devote all its 
resources to protecting a site and still fail to protect against the attack 37% of the time.44  
As CBRN attacks become more difficult at the equilibrium, the government takes 
advantage of the fact that it is relatively easy to defend against CBRN, and shifts effort 
towards protecting against conventional attacks. The adversary also substitutes away 
from increasingly difficult CBRN attacks and into the conventional attacks. We note the 
government shifts effort at a faster rate as it capitalizes on increasingly efficient defense 
against CBRN. The fraction of effort relative to their total resources are approximately 
equal for both parties at the difficulty index of f+,-. = 5.5. 
While the theoretical model provides a modest contribution by highlighting the 
multifaceted effects of target complexity on terrorist behavior, a vital contribution of this 
research arises from the model’s calibration to the data. We acknowledge that target 
complexity and adversary effort are inherently unobservable to laypersons, but still 
provide an estimate of these values. In next section, we will present the data we do have, 
and note that their distributions match those we would expect from previous literature.  
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3. Data 
 
We begin with access to a very large, well known, and publicly available dataset 
on conventional attacks, known as Global Terrorism Database (GTD). We also have 
access to a unique dataset on unconventional CBRN types of attacks, the Profiles of 
Incidents Involving CBRN by Non-state Actors Database (POICN).  This newly 
developed database is a detailed collection of exclusively CBRN attacks. While GTD has 
initially evolved from different sources, in the more recent past it has been maintained 
and greatly expanded by the START Center at the University Maryland.  The POICN 
data has been exclusively developed within the START Center.  This has afforded us the 
unique opportunity to discuss with those who maintain both databases to ensure 
maximum compatibility. 
To avoid double-counting we use the GTD to examine only conventional attacks, 
and POCIN to examine only CBRN attacks.45 While POICN dataset includes a valuable 
component associated with “thwarted” attacks or planned attacked, the GTD dataset only 
captures attacks that are actually attempted. To render the two datasets comparable for 
our purposes, we exclude all aborted attack plans from our POICN dataset and focus 
exclusively attacks that were actually attempted, so called “out-the-door" attempts. As an 
additional precaution, we only include attacks noted as being reliably documented by the 
database administrators.  
We focus on casualties, which includes both injuries and fatalities.  We believe 
this serves as a proxy for intended size of the attack, because if an adversary is willing to 
injure a victim, it is likely they would be willing to see them as a fatality. Appropriately, 
we do not include adversaries’ own injuries and fatalities in our count. Since we focus on 
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modeling adversaries that prioritize inflicting substantial casualties, in order to avoid 
biasing our estimates we exclude attacks such as kidnappings, assassinations, or hostage-
taking. This leaves us with two complementary databases of potentially substantial 
attacks, one for conventional, the other for CBRN. Summary statistics for the data are 
presented in Table 20. 
We note that in both types of attack, the mean far outpaces the median, suggesting 
the distribution of attack casualties is highly right-skewed.   There appears to be a much 
thicker tail for CBRN attacks than conventional attacks, but on the whole, CBRN attacks 
tend to be much less frequent.  We recognize that this data is best characterized by a 
distribution with thick tails and a strong right skew, and take it expressly into account in 
the next step. 
 
4. Determining Mean of Successful Attacks 
 
 As we calibrate the model to the data, we first focus on the values of the weights, 
%&'() and %&'(), entering the adversary and defender expected utility functions.  Since 
we are interested in rare but extremely high-casualty events, rather than on low-casualty 
events with nonlethal motives, we restrict the relevant weights by this additional 
condition as well. Thus, equation 1 is modified as follows: 
% = /0$1$|6 $ $1!$  $h|6 $ $1$417     (1`) 
There are several probability distributions available that represent large or extreme 
events. Among them, the family of extreme value (EV) distributions as well as the 
associated generalized Pareto distributions stand out (see Cole 2001).  Mohtadi and 
Murshid (2009) were among the first to apply EV methodology to predict the likelihood 
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of terrorism events.46  About the same time as the conception of the Mohtadi-Murshid 
paper, Bohorquez et. al. (2009) used Pareto distribution to examine the incidence of 
terrorist attacks during Iraq war. The origin of these methodologies is the Fisher-Tippett 
(1928) theory of extremal distributions in which an asymptotic pattern emerges from the 
set of extremes of a sequence (e.g. the distribution of the hottest months of each year in 
the past century).  
 The use of the EV family, however, is not appropriate for our purposes here 
because it leads to a great loss of observations, and we have a small sample size of our 
POICN dataset.  Further, we are interested in modeling all substantial attacks, rather than 
simply the largest attack per week, month, or year.  Instead, we will opt for using 
Generalized Pareto (GP) as the distribution of choice to fit to our dataset.  Fortunately 
under certain conditions the equivalence of the two distributions can be in fact 
established. In particular, it can be shown (Coles, et al. 2001) that if a random variable X 
is any arbitrary member of the sequence of independent random variables,  XnXX ,..., 21  
subject to block maxima, },...,{ 21 nn XXXMaxM = so that by the Fisher-Tippett (1928)  
Theory above, )(}Pr{ zGzM n ≈≤   where G(z) is the Generalized Extreme Value 
distribution, then for a large enough value of a threshold, u, the probability that the 
exceedance, X-u, is larger than some value, y, is given by the Generalized Pareto 
distribution,  
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In this distribution, ξ is the shape parameter which represents the thickness of the tail 
(probability of catastrophic events), σ represents a scale parameter, and a location 
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parameter µ.47 While the shape, scale and location parameters can be determined by 
maximum likelihood estimation, we are required to parametrically select a threshold 
value over which substantial events occur.  The choice of threshold is determined by 
fitting each choice in threshold to the data and then examining the QQ plots.  In 
Appendix D, we examine the common choices of 10, 25, and 50 casualties. Using QQ 
plots and seeking a threshold value to best fit the data, we find that the threshold value of 
25 casualties fits best for both GP distributions. The mean of these GP distributions, 
therefore, when they exist should serve as a better estimate of the intended damage for 
ambitious and successful attackers. To highlight the difference between the two types of 
attack sets, we compare the means of the raw data, representing all attempted attacks, and 
the means of the GP distribution, representing an estimate of the potential damage from a 
substantial attack. We then show the parameters derived from fitting each of the two 
types of attack to GP distributions in Table 21. 
It is worth noting from this table that the mean number of casualties from 
historical data is lower than the mean of the GP distribution. In part, the difference is 
because the historical data includes attacks with no casualties, and those with relatively 
few casualties (<25). By contrast, the GP distribution has the heavy tail which, while it is 
inferred from the data, admits the possibility of attacks far more deadly than the historical 
data allows.  In the case of CBRN attacks, the tail is so heavy that it does not have a finite 
standard deviation. Still, we are able to obtain a finite mean and this allows us to perform 
our estimation and analysis moving forward. One implication of using the mean from GP 
distribution, rather than directly using the historical mean, is that the point estimates of 
%&'() and %+,-.  more accurately reflect the idea of substantial, successful attacks. 
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Ignoring small attacks and focusing on the likelihood of large attacks has one 
additional advantage for our modeling: If an attack has relatively few casualties, it seems 
plausible that attackers and the government consider the attack to have failed or been 
prevented in some important capacity. For example, a low-casualty biological attack may 
only inflict a few casualties because they failed to properly aerosol the biological agent, 
or the intended release location may have been blocked by security patrols.   On the other 
hand, the attackers may still consider their low-casualty attack a success. If the attackers 
had the goal of delivering few casualties with a biological weapon, then the attackers had 
specific goals other than inflicting mass casualties, such as spreading fear (Abrahms 
2008). Avoiding low intensity attacks bypasses this ambiguous definition of what 
constitutes a successful attack.48  
 
5. Estimating δ at Equilibrium  
 
Granting the model, data, and the threshold of 25 established above, we would 
like to estimate key variables of the model. As previously mentioned, critical parameters 
are unobserved due to the secretive preferences of the actors.  The only critical pieces of 
information we have are our estimated mean casualties from each type of attack, %, and 
the threshold of 25 grants us a probability of a successful substantial attack ex post, 
0. 7 = # 'j kP&lm cn ')op q +PmrPWom# 'j kP&lm . Using this as a baseline, we are able to establish 
an estimate of the values of the unobservable parameters ,  and .   
To do this, we first note that the game only requires two pieces of information to 
start:  and %. Having used the data to determine %, we evaluate the outcome of the 
game at many various values of the exogenously determined parameter . We then solve 
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the model for values of   and , given . From there, the equilibrium probability of 
successful substantial attack  0∗0, %, 7, 0%, 7, 7,  is calculated.  This theoretical 
probability has an empirical counterpart from the actual value which we know from the 
data for both types of attack: the percentage of attacks of each type above the threshold 
µ=25.49 We would like to choose  as best as possible to fit this probability for both types 
of attack. Consequently, we chose a simple minimization of squared errors as our criteria 
for best fit, selected for its resemblance to the classic ordinary least squares regression 
and because it leads to a fit in both dimensions.50 We therefore seek the values of f( that 
will minimize the error function below: 
min{F&'()Ff&'()J − &'(),I)o(J + F+,-.Ff+,-.J − +,-.,I)o(J}     (14) 
Here, I)o(, is the probability found from our data, f(is our exogenously chosen 
estimate of , which results in (Ff(J being found from our model. Performing a simple 
search of the values [1 … 10] by steps of 1 allows us to find a value of f(  that 
minimizes our squared error function. These search boundaries should be more than 
sufficient because Gy is much smaller than I)o(, and our functional form of 0. 7, is 
the product of two exponential functions. 
Having found our estimated value of f(, we also can obtain estimated current 
adversary expenditures, z( and the estimated optimum counter-terrorism investments, 
z(. Table 22 shows all relevant values for the equilibrium solution. We evaluate them for 
I = {1,10,20,30} to consider a range of adversary/government expenditure ratios, and 
find the fit clearly matches the correct probabilities and smallest error function best when 
I = 1. 
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We find that the initial estimate of delta suggests different levels of complexity 
parameter for different types of attack,  &'() = 4, while +,-. = 2. One possible 
explanation for this result is that a CBRN attack that has reached the “near-execution 
stage (so called “out of the door”), is perhaps slightly simpler- deploying a bomb or 
pressing a button.  The difficulty of these attacks lies within the assembly of such a 
device. For example, during the US anthrax scare of 2001, the creation of anthrax was 
difficult, but the execution (simply mailing them) was not. On the other hand, there 
seems to be many complexities and pre-existing barriers against executing large 
conventional attacks.  Such things like already existing local police forces, and rapidly 
responding police and other emergency forces well trained for conventional attacks, may 
make organized conventional attacks struggle to break the barrier of 25 casualties. 
Effort at security for the government is tilted towards suppressing CBRN attacks: 
&'() = 0, +,-. = 1. While this is probably not to be taken as a literal 100% it is likely 
that national security system heavily focuses on detection and prevention of any CBRN 
attacks, rather than focusing on preparing for conventional armed skirmishes. This seems 
rational given the higher number of expected casualties in large CBRN attacks, and their 
comparative simplicity in execution: once they are “out the door” they are simply taken 
to a crowded location and deployed.   
Conversely, the adversary also invests in committing and deploying CBRN 
weapons once an attack is prepared. We find that the adversary interested in substantial 
attacks focuses their effort in deploying CBRN weapons. &'() = 0.2279, +,-. =
0.7721.  The emphasis in CBRN can be attributed towards their relatively large 
anticipated casualties, and their relative ease of deployment once out-the-door.  Even 
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though the government has heavily invested in protecting against CBRN, the adversary 
might still inflict casualties. They can do this by emphasizing conventional weapons, 
even though they are more logistically complex to use in a large attack, and have lower 
anticipated casualties when successful. 
While it cannot be asserted that our proposed solution perfectly matches real 
investment by either party, the close fit suggests that they are at least plausible.  In fact, 
we correctly identify each of the probabilities of attack within an average of 2%.51 
 
6. Consequences of Unexpectedly Large Attacks 
 
At this point, we have estimated values for the complexity and effort levels,  
f(, z(, and  z( obtained from fitting of the current observed data on actual “out-the-door” 
attacks to the theory.  These are the Nash equilibrium values. But in real world new 
unforeseen shocks imply that the government’s guess about the behavior, the plans and 
the strategies of the adversary will be inaccurate, due perhaps to imperfect intelligence 
about the adversary’s capabilities. As an example, unbeknownst to the defender 
government, adversary may have developed a way of delivering a successful attack with 
much greater casualties than the defender government expects from past history.  
Alternatively, again unbeknownst to the defender government, the adversary may have 
the capability of using a new technology that would allow it to execute a relatively 
complex attack with greater simplicity.   We examine each of these two scenarios below.  
In the first scenario, based on their own private information, adversary groups 
anticipate their CBRN attack is of different severity than the mean, while the uninformed 
government merely prepares for attacks at the mean level of severity. For illustration we 
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consider a case of underestimation here, where  /0%+,-.| 58$7 ≠
/0%+,-.| 9	87. Again we use the equilibrium values of: &'() = 2, +,-. =
1, P = 1, I = 1, %&'() = 66.7, and %+,-. = 168.5 from Table 22 as the base 
conditions, due to their superior fit quality. We then consider that the adversary is better 
informed than the government as to the true realization of %+,-.. To model this, we 
assume that %+,-. is revealed to the adversary prior to the attack, but after the 
government has already established defenses, and the government does not know such a 
revelation is occurring. For the sake of simplicity, the government is considered to be 
entirely unaware of such a potentiality. To capture the variation in potentially realizable 
outcomes, we imagine %+,-. could range from -60% to +60% of the expected value of 
%+,-.. It is shown in Figure 8 how this information gap affects the outcome, or the 
casualty count. Obviously, as the realization of %+,-. shown to the adversary increases, 
so does the expected number of CBRN casualties. However, the CBRN casualties 
increase at a rate faster than the simple increase in %+,-.. Conversely, the total number 
of casualties from conventional attacks declines, and eventually reaches zero. The net 
number of casualties, from both types of attack together, gradually climbs at an 
accelerating rate until it because linear and remains such indefinitely.  
As shown by the subsequent Figure 9, this decline in conventional casualties, and 
faster-than-linear increase in CBRN casualties, can be explained by the adversary 
recognizing the unique opportunity for CBRN attacks against the misinformed 
government, and thus focusing more effort on CBRN attacks.  As such, the growth in 
CBRN casualties is due to both the higher lethality and the increased adversary 
investment in CBRN.  The increase in total casualties is softened by the reduction in 
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conventional casualties, but with very large increases in CBRN casualties, the adversary 
will entirely divest from conventional attacks. Again, the government is relatively 
unprepared for such attacks, having not been informed about any potential changes in 
casualty counts.  
Next consider the case where the lethality 0%7 of potential attacks are again well 
understood and fixed, but complexity of a potential attack 07 by the adversary is not 
well understood by the defender government. In this scenario, the adversary has access to 
a technique or technology unforeseen by the defending government that simplifies the 
process of attack.  An example may be bringing a firearm into a secure building 
becoming far simpler through improved plastic technology.  Such improvements, if not 
anticipated by the defender government, would falsely lead the government to believe 
that a type of attack is too complex for the adversary to invest heavily in. The 
overconfidence leads to an inferior defense of the target, allowing the adversary to 
opportunistically take advantage of superior information, and inflict additional casualties.  
Compared to the correctly informed setting, the target society will experience larger 
casualties.  
Figure 10 and 11 depict this scenario of unusually simple or complex attacks, 
again using the same equilibrium parameters identified in Table 22 as a base. Again, we 
then vary the value of our parameter of interest, this time +,-., for the adversary, but 
only make this change after the government has established defenses, and without 
foresight of this change on the part of the government. Figure 10 plots the total number of 
casualties that will occur if the government plans its defense based on a faulty estimation 
of what the government estimates the adversary capabilities for carrying out a complex 
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CBRN attack. Notice the range of casualties after mis-estimation are potentially much 
larger than the casualties in Figure 8 . This suggests that estimating the complexity of the 
attack correctly is of much greater importance than correctly assessing the impending 
casualties.  If both are inaccurate by a large proportion, the casualties from inaccuracies 
in complexity far outweigh those of a proportionally equivilant error in lethality. The 
complexity parameter entering exponentially into the probability of success (see equation 
3) plays a much larger role in the value of that probability, and thus of the expected 
number of causalities.  We note that there appears to be an eventual spike in conventional 
casualties when the complexity of CBRN attacks is very low, and turn to the behavior of 
the adversary in Figure 11 to identify why.  
In Figure 11, we note that the adversary’s efforts are not shifting purely in one 
direction. As a CBRN attack becomes less complex from our equilibrium values, the 
adversary initially invests more into the attack.  This is because they see greater marginal 
returns for their effort within a CBRN attack as it becomes simpler to perform. However, 
as the attack complexity reaches very low levels, the success of the CBRN attack is 
nearly assured.  Additional effort towards CBRN at this point does not substantially 
increase the probability of a successful CBRN attack. Adversaries then take some of their 
resources and divert them away from the nearly assured CBRN event and towards the 
potentially contentious conventional efforts. The result is that net casualties continue to 
increase, as that there is not only extremely likely a large number of CBRN casualties, 
but it will be further supplemented by the adversary’s ability to assign surfit effort from 
CBRN into conventional attacks.  
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In sum, we have identified that a goverment error in anticipating the complexity 
of an attack can result in substantially more casualties.  An immediate policy implication 
is that intelligence efforts should focus on establishing (and increasing) the obstacles 
opponents face in performing an attack, rather than assessing how catastrophic the 
consequences of a large attack might be.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have developed a sequential game of conflict between a government and an 
adversary organization. This model is used to analyze the strategic choices of effort 
allocation between large CBRN and large conventional threats. Using this model, we 
match theory and data by estimating a key parameter of the model that describes the 
relative complexity of each type of attack. We do so by minimizing sum squared error 
between the observed and the theoretical probability of success in an attack in a model 
where all other starting parameters can be identified beforehand. With this parameter 
estimate, we are then able to back out the Nash equilibrium values of effort by both sides.   
Finally, anticipating that the government will eventually be caught unaware by 
some shock, we model the consequences of such unfortunate surprises in attack 
complexity and lethality.  This forecast of casualties identifies the scale of potential 
future disasters when the attack size or its complexity are grossly misestimated ex anti.  
We identify that while it may be important to measure changes in the size of incoming 
attacks, the most critical challenge for the defending government is to accurately estimate 
the complexity of in the execution of the attack.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: BOSS Operating Range 
 
Notes: Marked Points Represent UWM Facilities, and the dark boarder represents the 
boundary of BOSS operations. 
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Figure 2: Plot of Weekly Crime and Hours Open 
 
Notes: Displays 5-week moving averages 
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Notes: The entire blue area outline in dashed blue line is service by the safe-ride program.   
The purple and dark blue lines through the center are the dedicated bus routes.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Boundaries of the Safe Ride Program and the Bus Routes 
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Figure 4: Weekly Crime Counts across the Data Window 
 
Notes: Weekly crime counts are shown as a 13 week moving average. The 13 week 
moving average is not evaluated across the treatment start date, represented by the 
vertical line. 
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Figure 5: The Model of Government Defense Against Adversary Attacks 
77 
 
 Figure 6: Equilibrium Effort in Response to Attack Complexity 
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Effort in Response to Cross Attack 
Complexity 
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Figure 8: Number of expected casualties with respect to size of shock to CBRN Casualties 
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s 
Figure 9: Effort with respect to size of shock to CBRN casualties 
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Figure 10: Casualties occurring in response to a shock in CBRN complexity 
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Figure 11: Adversary effort in response to a shock in CBRN complexity 
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Figure 12, Appendix D: Quantile-Quantile Plots of Conventional Attack Casualties at Thresholds of 10, 25, and 50 
84 
 
  
Figure 13, Appendix D: Quantile-Quantile Plots of CBRN Attack Casualties at Thresholds of 10, 25, and 50 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Number of Changes between Open and Closed by Hour of Week 
 Hour Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
Morning 
0 28 26 23 21 27 27 30 
1 20 18 16 16 20 20 20 
Evening 
17 4 5 3 3 3 3 4 
18 26 27 23 29 27 27 28 
19 27 38 24 30 28 28 29 
20 27 38 24 30 28 28 29 
21 27 38 24 30 28 28 29 
22 27 38 24 30 28 30 29 
23 27 24 22 28 28 30 29 
Note: The hours from the 2nd to 16th hour of the day were suppressed because the 
program was always closed during those hours 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Data 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Rides Given 15.266 29.661 
Program is Open (1 if Open, 0 otherwise) 0.248 0.432 
Daily Precipitation (cm) 0.249 0.728 
Daily Snowfall (cm) 0.048 0.233 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm) 0.267 0.637 
Daily Minimum Temperature (degrees C) 4.779 10.38 
Total Crime 0.934 1.647 
School in Session (1 if Open, 0 otherwise) 0.914 0.281 
Total Probability of Crime 47.30% - 
   Note: Averages are taken over the entire data set. 
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Table 3: Poisson Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Open -0.09102 -0.08757 -0.0848 -0.15179 
 (1.84)* (1.74)* (1.68)* (3.56)*** 
School in Session  0.16624 0.17256 0.18292 
  (4.49)*** (4.63)*** (5.35)*** 
Daily Precipitation (cm)   -0.01742 -0.0186 
   (1.42) (1.47) 
Daily Snowfall (cm)   -0.10731 -0.09934 
   (2.64)*** (2.46)** 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)   -0.02491 -0.02535 
   (1.21) (1.21) 
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co)   0.00505 0.00437 
   (2.29)** (1.96)* 
Constant -0.04617 -0.20954 -0.15056  
 (1.15) (3.55)*** (2.56)**  
N 30,648 30,648 30,648 30,648 
Clustering by Hour of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168)    Yes 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option 
200 times to avoid overdispersion. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: OLS Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Open -0.08307 -0.08012 -0.07765 -0.12474 
 (1.82)* (1.72)* (1.67)* (3.25)*** 
School in Session  0.14422 0.15119 0.15954 
  (4.56)*** (4.74)*** (5.54)*** 
Daily Precipitation (cm)   -1.65092 -1.73386 
   (1.47) (1.51) 
Daily Snowfall (cm)   -7.50984 -6.78262 
   (2.79)*** (2.51)** 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)   -1.86833 -1.92437 
   (1.20) (1.19) 
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co)   0.04694 0.04085 
   (2.35)** (2.04)** 
Constant 0.95488 0.95488 0.81339 0.86347 
 
(24.74)**
* 
(16.11)**
* 
(16.81)**
* 
(18.40)**
* 
N 30,648 30,648 30,648 30,648 
Clustering by Hour of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168)    Yes 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option 
200 times to avoid overdispersion. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5: Poisson Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region Among 
Typically Open Hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Open -0.14664 -0.14923 -0.14165 -0.1605 
 (2.48)** (2.38)** (2.21)** (3.45)*** 
School in Session  0.32689 0.33163 0.33355 
  (4.36)*** (4.40)*** (4.54)*** 
Daily Precipitation (cm)   -0.02248 -0.02545 
   (1.07) (1.15) 
Daily Snowfall (cm)   -0.25187 -0.24199 
   (3.27)*** (2.98)*** 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)   -0.01018 -0.01183 
   (0.38) (0.43) 
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co)   0.00777 0.00712 
   (2.28)** (2.17)** 
Constant 0.00945 -0.327 -0.24743  
 (0.15) (3.04)*** (2.28)**  
N 30,648 30,648 30,648 30,648 
Clustering by Hour of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168)    Yes 
Dropped Hours 2am-4pm (inclusive) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option 
200 times to avoid overdispersion. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6: ZIP Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region Among Typically 
Open Hours 
 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal Effects with 
Dummies 
Open -0.13720 -0.13443 
 (2.15)** (3.04)*** 
School in Session 0.32779 0.26084 
 (4.36)*** (6.00)*** 
Daily Precipitation (cm) -0.024 -0.02163 
 (1.17) (0.93) 
Daily Snowfall (cm) -0.2097 -0.1777 
 (2.30)** (2.29)** 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm) 0.00015 -0.00344 
 (0.01) (0.11) 
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co) 0.00822 0.00699 
 (2.41)** (2.16)** 
N 11,493 11,493 
Clustering by Hour of Week Yes Yes 
Month Controls Yes Yes 
Hour of Week Dummies Included (168)  Yes 
Dropped Hours 2am-4pm (inclusive) Yes Yes 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option 
200 times to avoid overdispersion. In both regressions, the sample was restricted to hours 
in which the program was typically open. The second column represents the results from 
distributing the tasks onto the larger computer in order to support the addition of 
dummies to the estimation. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Poisson Regressions of the Two Types of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride 
Region 
 
Social and Property 
Crimes Personal Crimes 
Open -0.14011 -0.1818 
 (3.11)*** (2.35)** 
School in Session 0.16874 0.2405 
 (4.46)*** (3.65)*** 
Daily Precipitation (cm) -0.0088 -0.0589 
 (0.69) (1.91)* 
Daily Snowfall (cm) -0.09855 -0.10304 
 (2.28)** (0.90) 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm) -0.03488 0.01334 
 (1.49) (0.40) 
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co) 0.00348 0.00791 
 (1.37) (2.00)** 
N 30,648 30,648 
Clustering by Hour of Week Yes Yes 
Month Controls Yes Yes 
Hour of Week Dummies Included 
(168) Yes Yes 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option 
200 times to avoid overdispersion. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Poisson Regressions of the Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region with a 
Weekend Interaction Term 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Open -0.07129 -0.06925 -0.06773 -0.16965 
 (1.32) (1.28) (1.25) (3.32)*** 
Open * Weekend -0.07190 -0.06675 -0.06243 0.06278 
 (0.95) (0.92) (0.86) (0.75) 
School in Session  0.16516 0.17153 0.18315 
  (4.49)*** (4.64)*** (5.35)*** 
Daily Precipitation (cm)   -0.01772 -0.01856 
   (1.44) (1.47) 
Daily Snowfall (cm)   -0.10638 -0.09913 
   (2.60)*** (2.46)** 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)   -0.02496 -0.02527 
   (1.22) (1.20) 
Daily Minimum Temperature 
(Co)   
0.00496 0.00439 
   (2.25)** (1.97)** 
Constant -0.04617 -0.20870 -0.15035  
 (1.15) (3.54)*** (2.55)**  
N 30,648 30,648 30,648 30,648 
Clustering by Hour of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Hour of Week Fixed Effects 
(168)    
Yes 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option 
200 times to avoid overdispersion. The weekend is defined as any time during Friday, 
Saturday, or Sunday. Alternative definitions show minimal change. * p < 0.1; ** p < 
0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 9: Poisson Regression of the Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region on 
Program Intensity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rides Given -0.00375 -0.00179 -0.00171 -0.00484 
 (3.94)*** (1.38) (1.32) (4.81)*** 
School in Session  0.23457 0.22194 0.22519 
  (2.73)*** (2.58)*** (2.71)*** 
Daily Precipitation (cm)   -0.01921 -0.01245 
   (0.69) (0.42) 
Daily Snowfall (cm)   -0.30602 -0.31332 
   (3.49)*** (3.53)*** 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)   0.00423 0.01205 
   (0.13) (0.36) 
Daily Minimum Temperature 
(Co)   
0.00648 0.00384 
   (1.34) (0.83) 
Constant 0.08904 -0.33866 -0.24794  
 (1.29) (2.70)*** (1.82)*  
N 7,598 7,598 7,598 7,598 
Clustering by Hour of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Hour of Week Fixed Effects 
(168)    
Yes 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option 
200 times to avoid overdispersion. The sample was restricted to contain only the hours in 
which the program was open. Alternative definitions show minimal change. * p < 0.1; ** 
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 10: Poisson Regression of the Two Types of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride 
Region on Program Intensity 
  
Social and Property 
Crimes 
Social and Property Crimes 
Rides Given -0.00401 -0.00688 
 (3.29)*** (3.76)*** 
School in Session 0.00254 -0.05397 
 (0.08) (1.01) 
Daily Precipitation (cm) -0.29023 -0.37316 
 (2.76)*** (1.94)* 
Daily Snowfall (cm) 0.02503 -0.02397 
 (0.75) (0.40) 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm) 0.00355 0.00472 
 (0.69) (0.62) 
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co) 0.21977 0.23922 
 (2.25)** (1.57) 
Constant   
   
N 7,598 7,598 
Clustering by Hour of Week Yes Yes 
Month Controls Yes Yes 
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168) Yes Yes 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option 
200 times to avoid overdispersion. The sample was restricted to contain only the hours in 
which the program was open. The weekend is defined as any time during Friday, 
Saturday, or Sunday. Alternative definitions show minimal change. * p < 0.1; ** p < 
0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 11: Poisson Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region on Program 
Intensity with a Weekend Interaction Term 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rides Given -0.00295 -0.00081 -0.00078 -0.00306 
 (3.00)*** (0.62) (0.58) (2.81)*** 
Rides Given * Weekend -0.00185 -0.00193 -0.00187 -0.00513 
 (1.91)* (2.00)** (1.94)* (3.36)*** 
School in Session  0.22222 0.21065 0.22103 
  (2.53)** (2.40)** (2.65)*** 
Daily Precipitation (cm)   -0.02148 -0.01318 
   (0.76) (0.45) 
Daily Snowfall (cm)   -0.30165 -0.31940 
   (3.38)*** (3.57)*** 
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)   0.00462 0.01195 
   (0.14) (0.36) 
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co)   0.00590 0.00372 
   (1.23) (0.80) 
Constant 0.07288 -0.34875 -0.26222  
 (1.05) (2.71)*** (1.87)*  
N 7598 7598 7598 7598 
Clustering by Hour of Week Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168)       Yes 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option 
200 times to avoid overdispersion. The sample was restricted to contain only the hours in 
which the program was open. The weekend is defined as any time during Friday, 
Saturday, or Sunday. Alternative definitions show minimal change. * p < 0.1; ** p < 
0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 12: Summary Statistics 
Notes: Bus rides delivered are averaged over the weeks of bus service 
 
  
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Marquette Weekly Crime Count 45.59 18.75 
MSOE Weekly Crime Count 23.65 11.27 
Snow on Ground (mm) 24.45 57.72 
Minimum Temperature (◦C) 5.24 109.99 
Spring Semester 0.34 0.47 
Fall Semester 0.28 0.45 
Summer School 0.25 0.43 
Safe Rides Delivered 4794.34 2797.38 
Bus Rides Delivered 623.10 752.84 
Total Rides Delivered 5417.44 3289.56 
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Table 13: Evidence of Substitution between Transit Services 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Policy -1736* -1771*** -1680*** 
 (899.1) (589.8) (452.2) 
Policy *Time Trend 5.841 7.901** 7.693*** 
 (5.412) (3.478) (2.654) 
Time Trend -0.666 -2.751 -2.666 
 (4.516) (2.897) (2.180) 
Spring Semester  4,174*** 4,847*** 
  (365.6) (1,178) 
Fall Semester  3,989*** 2,212*** 
  (389.2) (741.8) 
Summer Semester  66.75 -46.17 
  (471.0) (910.1) 
Snow on Ground (mm)  5.466** -4.107*** 
  (2.201) (1.391) 
Minimum Temperature (C)  -1.538 -9.204*** 
  (1.622) (2.091) 
Constant 4,798*** 2,257*** 711.2*** 
 (433.1) (401.6) (272.5) 
Week of Year Dummies   YES 
    
Observations 365 365 365 
R-squared 0.011 0.627 0.815 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Dependent variable is the number of rides delivered by the safe ride program. 
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Table 14: Crime in the Marquette University Neighborhood vs Control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Policy -3.693*** -3.934*** -3.936*** -1.198 0.879 
 (1.192) (1.174) (1.182) (2.231) (2.350) 
Policy*MU Neighborhood -6.328*** -6.783*** -6.929*** -6.926*** -11.08** 
 (2.250) (2.137) (2.147) (2.148) (4.378) 
MU Neighborhood 29.65*** 32.05*** 37.17*** 37.10*** 35.34*** 
 (1.760) (3.491) (4.369) (4.388) (4.663) 
Snow on Ground (mm)  -0.0176 -0.00505 -0.00401 -0.00405 
  (0.0109) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
Minimum Temperature (C)  0.0360*** 0.0274* 0.0295* 0.0295* 
  (0.00802) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0153) 
Time Trend    -0.0150 -0.0263** 
    (0.0105) (0.0114) 
MU Neighborhood*Time Trend     0.0227 
     (0.0208) 
School Calendar Interactions  YES YES YES YES 
Week of Year Dummies   YES YES YES 
Constant 25.67*** 22.63*** 19.08*** 20.64*** 21.39*** 
 (0.953) (1.631) (5.944) (6.007) (6.010) 
      
Observations 730 730 730 730 730 
R-squared 0.455 0.512 0.545 0.547 0.548 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Decomposition of MU 
 
VARIABLES 
MU vs MSOE 
(Original 
Estimate) 
MU Bus vs 
MSOE 
MU Safe 
Rides vs 
MSOE 
Policy  0.879 0.890 0.655 
 (2.350) (2.306) (2.273) 
Policy*MU Neighborhood -11.08**   
 (4.378)   
Policy*MU Bus Neighborhood   -7.235**  
  (3.361)  
Policy*MU Safe Ride Neighborhood   -4.912 
   (3.216) 
MU Neighborhood 35.34***   
 (4.663)   
MU Bus Neighborhood  6.256  
  (3.802)  
MU Safe Ride Neighborhood   4.338 
   (3.373) 
Snow on Ground (mm) -0.00405 0.00140 -0.0149 
 (0.0125) (0.0101) (0.0105) 
Minimum Temperature (C) 0.0295* 0.0176 0.00639 
 (0.0153) (0.0122) (0.0117) 
Time Trend -0.0263** -0.0268** -0.0255** 
 (0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0109) 
MU Neighborhood*Time Trend 0.0227   
 (0.0208)   
MU Bus Neighborhood*Time Trend  0.0346**  
  (0.0164)  
MU Safe Ride Neighborhood*Time Trend   0.0162 
   (0.0151) 
    
    
School Calendar Interactions YES YES YES 
Week of Year Dummies YES YES YES 
Constant 21.39*** 24.89*** 19.14*** 
 (6.010) (5.533) (3.763) 
    
Observations 730 730 730 
R-squared 0.548 0.191 0.186 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 16: MU Safe Ride vs MU Bus Areas 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Policy -4.479*** -4.821*** -5.889** 
 (1.292) (1.248) (2.429) 
Policy*MU Safe Ride Neighborhood -1.064 -1.054 2.239 
 (1.719) (1.659) (3.282) 
MU Safe Ride Neighborhood -5.236*** -3.840 -2.285 
 (1.313) (2.583) (2.793) 
Snow on Ground (mm)  0.00444 0.00467 
  (0.0108) (0.0107) 
Minimum Temperature (C)  0.0334*** 0.0338*** 
  (0.0126) (0.0126) 
Time Trend   0.00589 
   (0.0120) 
MU Safe Ride Neighborhood*Time Trend   -0.0181 
   (0.0156) 
School Calendar Interactions  YES YES 
Week of Year Dummies  YES YES 
Constant 30.28*** 35.14*** 34.68*** 
 (0.999) (5.420) (5.292) 
    
Observations 730 730 730 
R-squared 0.101 0.229 0.231 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Initial Robustness Checks 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Each entry is from a different regression. The leads are the two six month periods 
prior to the bus service and these are also interacted with the treatment areas. The 
alternative control is a comparable neighborhood in the same city. The comparison 
between the bus area and safe ride only area is independent of the choice of control.  
 
 
 
  
Regions Included in Regression Original 
Estimates 
 
False 
Treatment 
(One Yr. 
Prior) 
False 
Treatment 
(One Yr. 
After) 
Two 
Leads  
(6 month) 
Alternative 
Control 
(Bay View) 
University vs Control -11.08** -0.991 3.660 -10.82** -14.98** 
     (4.378) (3.882) (4.278) (5.271) (6.398) 
      
Bus Area vs Control -7.235** -2.292 0.0733 -8.438** -11.95** 
     (3.361) (3.067) (3.226) (4.085) (5.813) 
      
Safe Ride Only Area vs Control -4.912 -4.511 4.517 -8.474** -9.734* 
    (3.216) (2.821) (3.160) (3.973) (5.744) 
      
Bus Area vs Safe Ride Only 2.239 -2.250 4.332 -0.324 2.239 
     (3.282) (3.012) (3.163) (4.023) (3.282) 
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Table 18: Additional Robustness Checks 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Each entry is from a different regression. MU interior (including bus line interior 
as treated), line 1 is the same as original estimates by necessity, nothing changes in either 
of the comparison groups. 
  
Regions Included in Regression Original 
Estimates 
 
Dropping 
Irrelevant 
Offenses 
 Including 
Expansion 
MU Interior 
(Including Bus 
Line Interior as 
Treated) 
University vs MSOE -11.08** -10.97** -13.54*** -11.08** 
     (4.38) (4.332) (4.450) (4.38) 
     
Bus Area vs MSOE -7.235** -7.006** -7.235** -9.238** 
     (3.361) (3.326) (3.361) (3.742) 
     
Safe Ride Only Area vs MSOE -4.912 -4.838 -6.027* -3.590 
    (3.216) (3.188) (3.147) (2.953) 
     
Bus Area vs Safe Ride Only 2.239 2.091 0.0622 -4.311 
     (3.282) (3.249) (3.432) (3.412) 
103 
 
Table 19: Bus Program Is More Effective On Weekends 
VARIABLES Full Sample Weekends Only Weekdays Only 
University vs MSOE -11.08** -8.371*** -2.707 
 (4.378) (2.983) (2.635) 
    
Bus Area vs MSOE -7.235** -5.301** -1.934 
 (3.361) (2.409) (2.021) 
    
Safe Ride Only Area vs MSOE -4.912 -4.455* -0.459 
 (3.216) (2.360) (1.892) 
    
Bus Area vs Safe Ride Only 2.239 0.910 1.329 
 (3.282) (2.357) (2.056) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Each entry is from a different regression 
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Table 20: Summary Statistics of Terrorism Data 
VARIABLES Conventional CBRN 
Mean Casualties 6.1 14.7 
Median Casualties 1 0 0$1$ > 07 0.65 0.441 0$1$ > 57 0.216 0.188 0$1$ > 107 0.124 0.167 0$1$ > 257 0.047 0.097 0$1$ > 507 0.018 0.043 0$1$ > 1007 0.006 0.032 
N 47476 186 
Types of Attacks Included Firearms 
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 
Fake Weapons 
Incendiary 
Melee 
Vehicle 
Sabotage Equipment 
Chemical Biological 
Radiological 
Nuclear 
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Table 21: Comparison of Means 
VARIABLES Conventional CBRN 
Historical Mean Casualties of All Attacks 6.1 14.7 
Estimated Mean Casualties of Substantial Attacks 
(Generalized Pareto) 
66.7 168.5 
Standard Deviation 105 Infinite 
Xi (Shape) 0.4213 
(0.0293)*** 
0.7610 
(0.3767)** 
Sigma (Skew) 24.1192   
(0.8399)***  
34.288  
(15.4721)** 
Threshold (Chosen Parametrically) 25 25 
Note: The standard errors for the estimated parameters are listed in parentheses below the 
estimate. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 22: Results of Calibration Process 
P I f&'() f+,-. Sum of 
Squared 
Errors  
z&'() z+,-. z&'() z+,-. &'() +,-. 
1 1 4 2 0.0027 0.1016 0.8984 0.3602 0.6398 0.0574 0.0454 
1 10 2 1 0.0114 2.9341 7.0659 0.3851 0.6149 4.9534e-4 3.9211e-4 
1 20 2 1 0.0115 6.2674 13.733 0.3851 0.6149 6.3043e-07 4.9879e-07 
1 30 2 1 0.0115 9.6007 20.399 0.3851 0.6149 8.0236e-10 6.352e-10 
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Tables, Appendix A: Can Safe Rides Reduce Urban Crime? 
 
Table 23, Appendix A: Summary of Crime Count Data 
  Offense Type Count of Offenses 
1 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT†‡ 1488 
2 ALL OTHER LARCENY‡ 3815 
3 ALL OTHER OFFENSES 97 
4 ARSON‡ 82 
5 BURGLARY‡ 2730 
6 COUNTERFEITING/FORGERY 4 
7 CREDIT CARD/ATM FRAUD 9 
8 DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY 5081 
9 DISORDERLY CONDUCT 262 
10 EXTORTION/BLACKMAIL 0 
11 FALSE PRETENSES/SWINDLE/CONFIDENCE GAME 1 
12 FORCIBLE FONDLING†‡ 97 
13 FORCIBLE RAPE†‡ 75 
14 FORCIBLE SODOMY†‡ 53 
15 HOMICIDE†‡ 28 
16 IMPERSONATION 4 
17 INCEST† 1 
18 INTIMIDATION† 29 
19 KIDNAPPING† 100 
20 LIQUOR LAW VIOLATIONS 20 
21 MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT‡ 2493 
22 POCKET PICKING 51 
23 PURSE SNATCHING 110 
24 ROBBERY†‡∗ 1788 
25 SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH AN OBJECT†‡ 15 
26 SHOPLIFTING‡ 333 
27 SIMPLE ASSAULT† 1912 
28 STATUTORY RAPE† 45 
29 STOLEN PROPERTY OFFENSES 8 
30 THEFT FROM BUILDING‡ 198 
31 THEFT FROM COIN-OPERATED MACHINES‡ 33 
32 THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLE‡ 5655 
33 THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS‡ 1951 
34 TRESPASSING 66 
35 WEAPON LAW VIOLATIONS 0 
Note: Crimes were categorized as a crime against persons (†) or otherwise according to 
the Uniform Crime Reporting classification system. ∗ = This crime always is 
accompanied by an assault, so it has an element of crimes against persons which is not 
recorded separately. Crimes reported to the UCR are marked with a ‡. 
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Tables, Appendix B: University Provided Transit and Urban Crime 
 
Table 24, Appendix B: Crime in the Marquette University Neighborhood vs Control: 
Alternative Specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Linear 
Model 
Log Crime 
Model 
Poisson 
Model 
Negative 
Binomial 
Model 
     
Policy 0.879 0.0777 0.0475 0.0468 
 (2.350) (0.110) (0.0953) (0.0916) 
Policy*MU Neighborhood -11.08** -0.311** -0.251** -0.241** 
 (4.378) (0.137) (0.119) (0.116) 
MU Neighborhood 35.34*** 0.996*** 0.921*** 0.959*** 
 (4.663) (0.150) (0.127) (0.134) 
Snow on Ground (mm) -0.00405 -0.000521 -0.000201 -0.000306 
 (0.0125) (0.000484) (0.000402) (0.000391) 
Minimum Temperature (C) 0.0295* 0.000471 0.000833** 0.000520 
 (0.0153) (0.000491) (0.000420) (0.000417) 
Time Trend -0.0263** -0.00115** -0.00117** -0.00115** 
 (0.0114) (0.000537) (0.000466) (0.000458) 
MU Neighborhood*Time Trend 0.0227 0.00120* 0.00111* 0.00104* 
 (0.0208) (0.000667) (0.000576) (0.000574) 
Constant 21.39*** 2.894*** 3.167*** 3.078*** 
 (6.010) (0.194) (0.169) (0.174) 
     
School Calendar Interactions YES YES YES YES 
Week of Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Alpha (Dispersion Parameter)    -2.111*** 
    (0.0815) 
Observations 730 728 730 730 
R-squared 0.548 0.511   
Pseudo-R-Squared   0.3725  
Log Pseudolikelihood   -3729.86 -2901.37 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Tables, Appendix C: Modeling Adversary Preference and Strategic 
Response 
 
Table 25, Appendix C: Derivative of Model at Estimated Nash Values 
P I f&'() f+,-. z&'() z+,-. z&'() z+,-. %&'() %+,-. &'()&'()  &'()+,-. 
1 1 4 2 0.1016 0.8984 0.3602 0.6398 66.7 168.5 -0.4388 1.6514 
1 10 2 1 2.9341 7.0659 0.3851 0.6149 66.7 168.5 -2.2252 4.9674 
1 20 2 1 6.2674 13.733 0.3851 0.6149 66.7 168.5 -4.4473 9.4124 
1 30 2 1 9.6007 20.399 0.3851 0.6149 66.7 168.5 -6.6696 13.8561 
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Table 26, Appendix C: Government Second Order Conditions for Conventional δ 
P I f&'() f+,-. %&'() %+,-. z&'() z+,-. z&'() z+,-. SOC (C21) 
1 1 1 2 66.7 168.5 0.4480 0.5520 0.6149 0.3851 -149.6119 
1 1 2 2 66.7 168.5 0.2683 0.7317 0.5000 0.5000 -312.0027 
1 1 3 2 66.7 168.5 0.1637 0.8363 0.4189 0.5811 -279.3436 
1 1 4 2 66.7 168.5 0.1017 0.8983 0.3602 0.6398 -224.4579 
1 1 5 2 66.7 168.5 0.0623 0.9377 0.3160 0.684  -212.1286 
1 1 6 2 66.7 168.5 0.0359 0.9641 0.2815 0.7185 -224.5097 
1 1 7 2 66.7 168.5 0.0175 0.9825 0.2538 0.7462  -241.5723 
1 1 8 2 66.7 168.5 0.0043 0.9957 0.2311 0.7689 -255.4606 
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Table 27, Appendix C: Government Second Order Conditions for CBRN δ 
 
  
P I f&'() f+,-. %&'() %+,-. z&'() z+,-. z&'() z+,-. SOC (C21) 
1 1 2 2 66.7 168.5 0.2683 0.7317 0.5000 0.5000 -312.0027 
1 1 2 3 66.7 168.5 0.4656 0.5344 0.5811 0.4189 -361.1654 
1 1 2 4 66.7 168.5 0.5894 0.4106 0.6398 0.3602 -425.0426 
1 1 2 5 66.7 168.5 0.6730 0.3270 0.6840 0.3160 -502.0573 
1 1 2 6 66.7 168.5 0.7324 0.2676 0.7185 0.2815  -591.0325 
1 1 2 7 66.7 168.5 0.7766 0.2234 0.7462 0.2538 -691.3171 
1 1 2 8 66.7 168.5 0.8104 0.1896 0.7689 0.2311 -802.5532 
1 1 2 9 66.7 168.5 0.8370 0.1630 0.7879 0.2121 -924.5398 
1 1 2 10 66.7 168.5 0.8584 0.1416 0.8040 0.1960   -1.0572e03 
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Appendix C: Modeling Adversary Preference and Strategic 
Response 
 
Model Solutions 
 
Adversary: 
 
We begin by maximizing the adversary utility function, who is the second mover, subject 
to its resource constraint: 
VP = %&'() >1 − ABYZC[DYZC[ E FGHYZC[IYZC[J + %+,-. >1 − AB\]^_D\]^_ E FGH\]^_I\]^_J (C1) 
$.  P = &'() + +,-.                                                (C2) 
This leads us to: 
P = %&'() >1 − ABYZC[DYZC[ E FGHYZC[IYZC[J + %+,-. >1 − AB\]^_D\]^_ E FGH\]^_I\]^_J +
P0P − &'() − +,-.7                                                      (C3) 
The first order condition for this problem is algebraically symmetric. Thus, for either 
attack type, n ( = 1,2) the derivatives are: 
PC = cCo
ABCDC oACDCHC − P = 0                                                         (C4) 
B = P − &'() − +,-. = 0                                                          (C5) 
It is clear from the above equations that only a constrained condition can hold (i.e., 
)0≠aλ , otherwise naL ∂∂ / will be positive for all finite na values, only approaching 0 as 
( → ∞. Thus, eliminating aλ the FOC, implies CBRNconv aLaL ∂∂=∂∂ // or,  
cYZC[oABYZC[DYZC[ oAYZC[DYZC[HYZC[ − c\]^_o
BYZC[AaBD\]^_ oA\]^_D\]^_H\]^_ = 0                    (C6) 
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Substituting for +,-. = P − &'() , the best response function of the adversary, in the 
case of conventional weapon’s strategy is: 
&'()∗ 0&'(), +,-., &'() , +,-. , %&'(), %+,-.7 = W(
XYZC[AYZC[DYZC[ D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[ `I\]^_H\]^_` aBD\]^_bDYZC[` bD\]^_                
(C7) 
The second order conditions is:  
Gc\]^_oA\]^_D\]^_
ABYZC[aBD\]^_H\]^_ − cYZC[o
AYZC[DYZC[BYZC[DYZC[HYZC[ < 0                    (C8) 
This is always negative under a simple expected condition. The adversary has positive 
interest in destroying the area: %( > 0. 
Comparative Statics  
Since the remainder of the resources are fully spent, best response for CBRN strategy 
become: +,-.∗ 0&'(), +,-.7 = P − &'()∗ 0&'(), +,-.7.  Thus all comparative statics 
below hold with a reverse sign for the latter.  
 To examine the comparative statics, first we examine the effect of higher 
government counterinsurgency effort. We find that,  
NPYZC[NIYZC[ = − HYZC[H\]^_HYZC[`H\]^_ < 0                                      (C9) 
NPYZC[NI\]^_ = HYZC[H\]^_HYZC[`H\]^_ > 0                                     (C10) 
Notice the presence of a substitution in best response:  A rise in government 
counterinsurgency effort in CBRN category causes adversary to shift resources towards 
great effort in the conventional category.   
Next we examine the weight in the adversary utility function of each class of 
attack and find the results as expected: 
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NPYZC[NcYZC[ = HYZC[H\]^_cYZC[0HYZC[`H\]^_7 > 0                               (C11) 
NPYZC[Nc\]^_ = − HYZC[H\]^_c\]^_0HYZC[`H\]^_7 < 0                            (C12)  
Finally, we focus on the best response functions of the logistical complexity parameter, 
δ :   
NPYZC[NHYZC[ = − H\]^_0HYZC[`H\]^_GpBGH\]^_0
D\]^_XYZC[DYZC[X\]^_7`HYZC[IYZC[GH\]^_I\]^_`HYZC[H\]^_IYZC[70HYZC[`H\]^_7   
(C13) 
NPYZC[NH\]^_ = HYZC[0HYZC[`H\]^_GpB`HYZC[0
D\]^_XYZC[DYZC[X\]^_7GHYZC[IYZC[`H\]^_I\]^_`HYZC[H\]^_I\]^_70HYZC[`H\]^_7   
(C14) 
Here, we find the results to be ambiguous. One reason for this is the complex manner by 
which this parameter enters in to the optimal decision. To see this examine, for example 
equation C6).  Here one can see that a rise delta has several conflicting effects.  We have 
numerically estimated these values at the Nash equilibrium in Table 25, Appendix C. 
In this section, it has been shown that best response function for the adversary. 
This best response function is indeed a maximum by the second order condition, equation 
C8. Now the best response function is given to the first mover, the government. 
 
Government: 
 
The government, as a Stackelberg leader, maximizes the utility function: 
/0VI7 = %&'() 1 − 1 − ABYZC[∗DYZC[  GHYZC[IYZC[ + %+,-. 1 − 1 − AB\]^_∗D\]^_  GH\]^_I\]^_ (C15) 
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where &'()∗ 0&'(), +,-., &'() , +,-., %&'() , %+,-.7is from the adversaries best response 
(equation C7) and +,-.∗ 0&'(), +,-., &'() , +,-. , %&'(), %+,-.7 is from the counterpart 
of that equation. It is subject to the resource constraint: 
$.   I = &'() + +,-.                                                  (C16) 
 
 
The Lagrangian for this problem is: 
I = %&'() 1 − 1 − ABYZC[∗DYZC[  GIYZC[HYZC[ + %+,-. 1 − 1 − AB\]^_∗D\]^_  GI\]^_H\]^_
+IFI − &'() − +,-.J                                                                                                
(C17) 
Using similar reasoning as for the adversary, we note that the constraint must bind.  For, 
if it does not, there is a trivial solution as ( → ∞, and Ug takes its highest possible value 
of wconv+wCBRN. 
 Substituting for the best response functions for &'()∗ , +,-.∗ .  
I = %&'()

GHYZC[IYZC[


AZD\]^_XYZC[ADYZC[YZC[DYZC[X\]^_ D\]^_\]^_ aBD\]^_
DYZC[> bDYZC[ bD\]^_E − 1

 + 1


+%+,-.


GH\]^_I\]^_



AaBA
ZD\]^_XYZC[ADYZC[YZC[DYZC[X\]^_ D\]^_\]^_ aBD\]^_bDYZC[ bD\]^_D\]^_ − 1


 + 1



−IF&'() + +,-. − IJ
    
(C18) 
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We note the constraint must bind, so after substituting in I − +,-. = &'(), we can 
solve this as a function of a single variable, gconv. 
I = %&'()

GHYZC[IYZC[


AZD\]^_XYZC[ADYZC[YZC[DYZC[X\]^_ D\]^_0aAYZC[7 aBD\]^_
DYZC[> bDYZC[ bD\]^_E − 1

 + 1

 +
 %+,-.


GH\]^_FpGIYZC[J



AaBA
ZD\]^_XYZC[ADYZC[YZC[DYZC[X\]^_ D\]^_0aAYZC[7 aBD\]^_bDYZC[ bD\]^_D\]^_ − 1


 + 1



      
(C19)                
 
 Then taking derivatives with respect to &'(), we get the FOC: 
%&'()eGaB0
XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[7D\]^_DYZC[YZC[AD\]^_YZC[D\]^_aDYZC[D\]^_ +,-. −
%&'()eGaB>
XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[ED\]^_DYZC[YZC[AD\]^_YZC[D\]^_aDYZC[D\]^_ &'() −
%+,-.eGaBA>
XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[EDYZC[DYZC[YZC[AD\]^_YZC[D\]^_aDYZC[D\]^_ &'() +
%+,-.eGaBA>
XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[EDYZC[DYZC[YZC[AD\]^_YZC[D\]^_aDYZC[D\]^_ +,-. +
%&'()eGIYZC[HYZC[&'() − %+,-.eH\]^_FIYZC[GpJ+,-. = 0                (C20) 
While the first order condition does not allow us to isolate for gconv*, we can solve for it 
numerically, allowing us to solve the model. 
 
Then taking derivatives with respect to &'(), we get the SOC: 
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cb A
aB>XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[ED\]^_DYZC[YZC[AD\]^_YZC[D\]^_aDYZC[D\]^_ HYZC[FHYZC[GH\]^_JHYZC[`H\]^_ −
+,-.%+,-.eH\]^_FIYZC[GpJ − &'()%&'()eGIYZC[HYZC[ −
cYZC[ A
aB>XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[ED\]^_DYZC[YZC[AD\]^_YZC[D\]^_aDYZC[D\]^_ H\]^_FHYZC[GH\]^_JHYZC[`H\]^_ +
c\]^_ A
aBA>XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[EDYZC[DYZC[YZC[AD\]^_YZC[D\]^_aDYZC[D\]^_ HYZC[FHYZC[GH\]^_JHYZC[`H\]^_ −
c\]^_ A
aBA>XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[EDYZC[DYZC[YZC[AD\]^_YZC[D\]^_aDYZC[D\]^_ H\]^_FHYZC[GH\]^_JHYZC[`H\]^_    
(C21) 
We evaluate this numerically in Appendix C, Table 26 and Table 27 to determine if it is 
less than zero in each circumstance, testing if gconv* is indeed a maximum for the 
government.  
The value of λg is found by looking at the derivative of the Lagrangian with 
respect to gconv without substitution, and inserting the appropriate values.  
%

eGIYZC[HYZC[&'() − eGaB>
XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[ED\]^_DYZC[YZC[D\]^_\]^_DYZC[D\]^_ &'() +
 A
aB>XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[ED\]^_DYZC[YZC[D\]^_\]^_DYZC[D\]^_ HYZC[H\]^_HYZC[`H\]^_ 
 −
HYZC[c\]^_ A
aBA>XYZC[D\]^_X\]^_DYZC[EDYZC[DYZC[YZC[D\]^_\]^_DYZC[D\]^_HYZC[`H\]^_ = I                        (C22) 
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Appendix D: Search for Best Threshold Value 
 
In the QQ plots Figure 12 and Figure 13, the threshold of 10 casualties, shown in 
the first rows, does not produce a good fit. As can been seen from the two rows, the 
General Pareto model with a threshold of 10 casualties overestimates the bulk of 
conventional casualties while fitting that same model to the CBRN attacks underestimate 
the bulk of CBRN casualties. This threshold choice, therefore does not fit either data set 
particularly well. 
The next natural threshold choice, 25 casualties, shown in the second rows, 
matches the QQ plot well for both conventional and CBRN attacks, and is able to capture 
a small number of large casualty events that are relevant in light of its highly right 
skewed shape. The fact that a threshold of 25 casualties seems to fit both conventional 
and CBRN attacks makes it a particularly appealing choice as our threshold for both, 
reducing empirical differences between each half of the model, and giving an equivalent 
definition of “substantial” to both types of attack.  
We also tried a threshold level of 50 casualties, shown in the last row of Figures 
12 and 13. This seems to be a poor threshold choice because it leaves very few (only 
eight) CBRN data points for use. For this reason, we reject 50 casualties as an appropriate 
choice, and use 25 casualties. This leaves us with approximately the upper 10% of our 
out-the-door CBRN attacks, and the upper 5% of our out-the-door conventional attack 
data.   
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Endnotes 
1 In addition to student safety, 26% of safe ride programs list good publicity as a reason 
for the creation of the program (Harding et al., 1988).  
2 Lacey, et al. (October 2000) study the influence of safe rides on drunk driving, but do 
not examine other types of crime.  
3 The yearly cost of BOSS averaged over the period of the study is $425,000.60, which 
was then divided by the number of yearly rides to get the cost per ride (University of 
Wisconsin Accounting Services, 2013).  
4 Due to the ending date, some only extend to 181 days, so there are only 180 observable 
changes. Thus, there are 30,684 (≈168x182) entries for each combination of date and 
hour of the week.  
5 The COMPASS system does not have any information about the victim or suspected 
perpetrator.  
6 Note that the service region includes a small neighboring suburb, and data is not 
available for that suburb. A few crime entries have insufficient geographic detail to 
identify the location, and are excluded. Finally, prior to the COMPASS data in 2005, 
there is no way to match crime to the service region of the safe ride program.  
7 Simple regressions of crime counts on trend return a significant positive coefficient 
while regressions of open hours on trend returns a near zero and insignificant coefficient.  
8 Maximum temperature was also collected, and used, but did not impact results 
significantly and so it was subsequently removed for brevity.  
9 The percentage change in crime from an increase in z is ¢∆¤ − 1, which is 
approximately ¥ for small ¥. 
10 After testing if measures for overdispersion are needed, a simple comparison shows 
that the variance of crime is about three times larger the mean, which suggests 
overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Another test of overdispersion indicates 
that it is not important, with residual deviance (51876) being less than twice that of the 
degrees of freedom (30463) (Palmer et al., 2007; Lindsey, 1999). Erring on the side of 
caution, bootstrapping is used. 
11 The other regressions in the paper have been examined with OLS and the results have 
been found to be very similar. 
12 A final threat to identification would be the creation of other campus crime programs. 
In January 2008, a small safe walk escort program began in the two blocks immediately 
around campus. Yet, removing all of the observations after its establishment does not 
diminish the coefficient of the safe ride program or its significance.   
13 In fact, in the typically open sample a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model is shown to be 
preferred to the Poisson by a Vuong Test (Vuong, 1989), with a test statistic from the 
normal distribution of 14.63, and a p-value indistinguishable from 0.   
14 It may be worth noting that while STATA discards estimations in an APE that do not 
converge, instead this algorithm repeated the estimation process until 200 successful 
convergences occurred. 
15 Uniquely, this bias may be minimized in this data set because the number of fixed 
effects that must be calculated was limited. Instead of having many different individuals, 
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this data set has a substantial number of time periods (182) per fixed effect, which may 
greatly mitigate the bias of incidental parameters, it is expected to be on the order of 
1/182 (Greene, 2002) 
16 A breakdown of the crime categories, and the frequency in which they occur, is in 
Table 12, placed in the Appendix.   
17 A number of other definitions of weekend were examined, and no meaningful variation 
occurred. 
18 The program is committed to sending a van to all who ask for a ride during the hours of 
operation.   
19 This estimation was repeated in the Bay View data set yielding a coefficient of 0.0001, 
with a standard error of 0.0016, again suggesting that the significance of the estimates are 
not an accident.   
20 Over the hours the program is open, 1,352 crimes of the type reported to the UCR a 
year were reported to local police. These types of crimes are labeled, along with their 
frequency in the data set, in Table 12, found in the Appendix. If the program causes a 
14% reduction in crime while operating, in accordance with the Poisson estimates, the 
actual crime count would have been 1,572 without the program. This is a reduction of 
220 crimes associated with the program.   
21 The estimates of elasticity of police per capita to nonviolent crime per capita was used, 
-0.501, the larger of the two broad crime categories, and a constant population was 
assumed for the sake of simplicity.   
22 There are currently 2,586 officers, and a new officer is salaried at $42,563 (City of 
Milwaukee , 2013), A quick calculation shows 2,586*1.2%*$42,563 = $1,318,179.   
23 As with the falsification test, the coefficient of -0.152 for the treated neighborhood is 
more than two standard deviations greater than this estimate.   
24 UWM maintains its own set of sworn officers.   
25 While data on the mix of transport programs across universities is not regularly 
collected, as early as the 1990s 34% of public four-year universities and 24% of private 
four-year universities reported operating a student transport program (Lewis et al., 1997). 
26 There is a related suggestion that interstate highways through rural areas increase crime 
by bringing criminals and potential victims more easily together (Marton 2013). 
27 The campus consolidation and expansion in student housing predate the time window 
we use to examine the advent of campus bus service. 
28 COMPASS is the Community Mapping, Planning and Analysis for Safety Strategies 
and it can be accessed at http://www.city.milwaukee.gov/compass. 
29 Indeed, as a privacy restriction, the police withhold addresses for sexual assaults and so 
these crimes are dropped from the sample. 
30 The terms differ slightly between universities and the three dummies for the relevant 
weeks of each university's term are entered as a determinants of crime only for the 
respective university neighborhood. 
31 The weeks in which class is not in session receive a zero for all three dummies. 
32 We even experimented with allowing for four time trends, control and university 
neighborhood both before and after the bus service.  Including these simply do not reduce 
the magnitude of the coefficient or its significance, maintaining the suggestion of a large 
reduction in crime associated with the advent of the bus service.  
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33 The addition of two or four time trends leaves the coefficient of interest essentially 
unchanged. 
34 It is worth noting that if the policy date is used in a placebo treatment of the MSOE vs. 
the Bay View neighborhoods, it emerges as insignificant. 
35 The dropped crimes are arson, bribery, burglary/breaking and entering, 
counterfeiting/forgery, credit card/ATM fraud, false pretenses/swindle/confidence game, 
impersonation, incest, weapon law violations, wire fraud and not classified. 
36 These additional specifications are available upon request. 
37 The phrasing of “successful” is in keeping with existing crime literature. In our case, 
we call an attack “successful” if it has incurred casualties. 
38 Later we will account for information asymmetries. 
39 If one believes that the behavior of government and adversary should entail risk-averse 
or precautionary behavior,  can be defined to incorporate such parameters.  If one 
believes the true parameter is, say, ¦ but ¦is subject to a shock §~00, ©7, then define  such that   = ª0′, ©7. Note that it must be the case that /0 ¦ + 7 ≠  due to its 
position in the exponent. 
40 While we have assumed a linear utility, there remains only one unique solution to the 
game.  We note that, the utility is strictly concave in effort level, and the sites are 
heterogeneous.   Thus the solution remains unique, despite the linearity of utility in 
expected damage (Zhuang and Bier, 2007). 
41 Zhuang and Bier (2007) have described some single-target circumstances where 
adversaries respond to an increase in government expenditures by increasing their own 
effort, as strategic complements. They find that a particular family of multiple-target 
games decompose into single-target games. They note such a breakdown will not, and 
should not, occur in model like ours because both parties are strictly bound by their 
budget constraints.  In short, we assume there are not enough resources to treat each 
attack as completely independent, and participants cannot expand their budget as a 
response to changes. 
42 See endnote 3, where the government is not risk neutral to shocks in ′ by construction.   
43 We have explored a variety of levels for I = {1,10,20,30}, in order to consider the 
fact that government expenditures are substantially larger than those of the terrorists. We 
have found that the model fit is dramatically better, by a factor of 5, when they are both 
normalized to 1. These results are shown in Table 3. 
44 This can be established by evaluating GHI, from equation 3, at G. 
45 For example, GTD also includes some CBRN data including those originally complied 
by Mohtadi and Murshid (2006).  We remove these and other CBRN data to avoid double 
counting.    
46 See also Mohtadi and Ruediger (2011) for a survey for extreme value literature as 
applied to finance. 
47 Note that µ and σ are related to, but not identical to the mean or standard deviation of 
this distribution. It is possible to have well defined values of µ and σ, but have no finite 
mean or standard deviation for a Pareto distribution as the asymptotic decay of the 
distribution may be too slow for defined mean or variance. Such a case has occurred in 
our estimations, as shown in Table 5. 
48 We remind that we have already dropped attacks of the type that are deliberately low-
casualty: kidnappings, assassinations, and hostage-taking, and hope to mitigate this 
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problem by doing so.  We admit the importance of such impacts, but note that it is 
impossible to quantify each of them. Without being able to explore such details, we rely 
on the thought that adversaries prefer attacks with over 25 casualties rather than less. 
49 We note that once an attack has made it out the door, the probability of successful 
substantial attacks, P(Casualties>25) , is 0.047 for conventional attacks and 0.097 for 
CBRN attacks. 
50 For example, using least absolute deviation instead, would have led to a fit in only one 
dimension. 
51 The square root of 0.0007/2 is 1.8% 
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